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THE ALLURE AND PERIL OF G ENETICS EXCEPTIONALISM:
DO WE N EED SPECIAL G ENETICS LEGISLATION?
SONIA M. SUTER, M.S., J.D. 1
Introduction
The Human Genome Project has been big news. After a much publicized race between
the private and public sector, the human genome has been completely decoded. Much has been
made of this accomplishment. Scientists promise that genetics will provide the key to
understanding disease, the developmental and aging processes, and the human species.
Ultimately, they hope it will prevent illness, help us tailor medicine to individual needs, and even
extend human life.
But as sanguine as people are about the promise of genetics, they are even more
captivated by its potential threats. Legal and bioethics scholars have written extensively about
the dangers of genetics discrimination by insurers, employers, and society. The media also
describe and scientists increasingly point out the perils of genetics. The public has absorbed
these messages. My students, friends, family, and cocktail-party acquaintances are all versed on
the possible sources of genetic discrimination. Policy makers, attuned to public sentiment, are
no less aware of these fears. Responding to increased concerns about genetics discrimination
and privacy, legislators have been extremely active in promoting genetics legislation. Although
a few states have had narrow versions of genetics legislation in place since the 1970s, forty-four
states currently have some form of legislation, most of it enacted in the last decade, that protects
genetic information. In addition, numerous genetics bills have been introduced in Congress
since 1995, though none has become legislation. To put it simply, public fears of genetics have
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intensified with the speed of genetic sequencing.
As we confront the newly-sequenced human genome, it is time to reassess the publicly
shared discourse about the ethical, legal, and social implications of genetics. Nearly all
discussions of the threats of genetics explicitly or implicitly suggest that the problems are as new
and fresh as the technology underlying it. In other words, we face a brave new world not only of
technology, but of social controversy. In the rush to identify and focus on the social
implications, most discussions skip over the initial and essential question – is there really
anything new here? Are we really in a brave new world of social and ethical issues, or does the
new technology simply ask us to reexamine long-standing, persistent, and thorny social issues
that we have never resolved?
The idea that genetic information is qualitatively different from other medical
information and therefore raises unique social issues has recently been described as “genetics
exceptionalism.” This notion is not merely abstract or theoretical but has dramatically
influenced policy efforts at the state and federal levels in recent years. This article challenges
this approach, arguing that concerns about genetics raise long-standing problems concerning
privacy and discrimination. Policy makers, however, wrongly view these concerns as
exceptional merely because the issues are cloaked in new technological guises. This article
asserts that genetic information is not unique and that concerns about abuses of information
should not be limited to genetic information, but should extend to other medical information.
The problem with genetics exceptionalism, however, is more serious than its underlying
conceptual confusion about whether medical and genetic information are different. Not only is
genetic information like other medical information, but treating the two differently under the law
leads to unintended inequities between individuals and classes, raising serious questions about
the propriety of public policy based on genetics exceptionalism. As we shall see, concerns about
genetics discrimination and privacy are concerns primarily of the middle to upper classes. Not
surprisingly, public policy that focuses solely on those concerns leaves unattended equally
serious concerns about discrimination and privacy regarding medical risks that primarily affect
the most disadvantaged in our society.
To understand fully the problem of genetics exceptionalism, one must consider its
origins. Only a few scholars have begun to draw attention to the problem of genetics
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exceptionalism and none has examined the various institutional forces that inspire and affirm this
perspective. Part I therefore describes the allure of genetics exceptionalism among the media,
popular culture, scientists, and policy makers. All of these groups contribute to and reinforce the
mystical view of the gene as powerful and uniquely threatening. This perspective sparks the fear
of genetics and has inspired a spate of genetics statutes at the state level and genetic bills at the
federal level, all of which embody genetics exceptionalism.
As Part II will discuss, this genetics legislation poses drafting challenges. Defining
genetic information so as to distinguish it from medical information is not easy, which squarely
presents the question whether genetic information is qualitatively different. Part II argues that it
is not. In fact, genetic information is an under- and over-inclusive category with respect to the
policy concerns motivating genetics legislation. Not all genetic information requires protective
legislation, making genetics legislation over-inclusive. More important, a great deal of other
medical information shares many of the features of genetic information that have inspired this
legislation, making it dramatically under-inclusive.
This under-inclusiveness, Part II argues, reflects the perils of genetics exceptionalism,
first because it results in inequities between similarly situated individuals, and worse because it
exacerbates class inequities. Until now, no one has fully fleshed out the problem of individual
inequities or, more important, addressed the problem of class inequities, which is the most
serious criticism of genetics legislation. Because genetics legislation only protects genetic
information, those facing non-genetic risks will not be protected. While genetic risks transcend
socio-economic class, non-genetic risks frequently do not. The poor and minorities face a
disproportionate degree of non-genetic, environmental risks and therefore are disproportionately
disadvantaged by laws that protect against discrimination based only on genetic risks.
Part II further advances the discussion of genetics exceptionalism by examining a
plausible defense for this under-inclusiveness – namely, the incremental strategy of addressing
one problematic issue at a time. This topic has received little scholarly attention in this context.
While incrementalism can sometimes be a useful strategy, Part II offers reasons to doubt its
ability to fulfill the promise of expanding the protections of genetics information to other
medical information in light of the deeply entrenched perspective of genetics exceptionalism.
Given that incrementalism may not lead to the needed reform, Part III considers why we
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should be particularly troubled by the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation. This underinclusiveness results in class and racial inequities that raise questions about important, though
under-enforced, constitutional values and norms embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.
Although such legislation would probably survive judicial review, equal protection theory
nevertheless offers normative policy reasons legislators should find the inequities of genetics
legislation morally problematic. Specifically, by attending to middle-class concerns, this
legislation unintentionally, disproportionately disadvantages the poor and minorities with respect
to fundamental interests in health care, employment, and privacy.
In order to avoid those inequities, Part III argues for more comprehensive protections that
extend beyond genetic information. To achieve that goal, genetics must be demystified and the
discourse about genetics among the public, media, and scientists must change. Rather than focus
on genetics per se, policy makers should turn their attentions to the features of genetic
information that make it seem uniquely threatening. As they do so, they will discover that these
features apply to most other medical information. It is my hope, that this recognition will inspire
efforts to address the problem of insurance/employment discrimination and privacy more broadly
by focusing on medical information, rather than just genetic information. Part III suggests
legislative approaches that avoid the inequities of genetics legislation by taking a broader focus
of the problems of privacy and insurance/employment discrimination.
The recent privacy regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human
Services under the authority of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(“HIPAA”) offer an ideal example. The federal privacy regulations protect all individually
identifiable health information used or disclosed electronically or orally by health plans, health
clearinghouses and health care providers. In other words, the regulations protect the most
sensitive of medical information – identifiable medical information – and they include, but are
not limited, to genetic information. The HIPAA privacy regulations, in short, avoid the trap of
genetics exceptionalism.
In the wake of these regulations, which set a national “floor” of privacy standards, above
which the states are free to set more stringent protections, states must begin to evaluate the
relationship between their genetics privacy statutes and the HIPAA privacy regulations. This
necessary reexamination of their privacy statutes provides an opportune moment for state
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legislatures to rethink the trend of treating genetic information differently from other medical
information. As a “reformed” genetics exceptionalist, I am hopeful that the federal example
combined with education that changes the social norms and discourse that contribute to genetics
exceptionalism will move state legislatures to reject a genetics exceptionalism approach and
develop more comprehensive reform in the area of insurance/employment discrimination and
privacy.
Part I. The Allure of Genetics Exceptionalism
It is no accident that genetics exceptionalism is so alluring and pervasive. The gene
evokes powerful images of promise and destruction, which are perpetuated in different ways by
various institutions and which render the gene exceptional in the public’s eye. Because genetics
exceptionalism is integral to the problems inherent in genetics legislation, Part I examines this
perspective among the public, the media, scientists, and finally legislators. Each group is
susceptible to and plays a special role in perpetuating this notion. Public perceptions are shaped
by media messages and scientific statements; the media use images of genetics that appeal to the
public; and scientists are attentive to public perceptions in trying to ensure funding for their
work. Likewise, legislators respond to public concerns, media stories, and scientists’ messages,
even as their legislation provides news material and shapes public views. In the end, a
confluence of factors and institutional forces individually and synergistically shape and reinforce
the notion that genetic information is uniquely threatening and susceptible to misuse.
A.

Public Perceptions
The public has a complicated, almost love-hate, relationship with genetics. It reveres and

fears things genetic, as evidenced by popular culture’s portrayal of the gene as both sacred and
powerful – a “cultural icon” as Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee describe so persuasively in
The DNA Mystique. 2 Underlying this view is a strong (and misguided) sense of genetic
determinism, the notion that genes determine and explain everything about us. For many, genes
define our essence, make us human, 3 and explain “our place in the world: our history, our social
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Id. at 40 (quoting former director of the Human Genome Project and Nobelist,
5

relationships, our behavior, our morality and our fate.” 4 The popular culture is replete with
evocative images of single genes with tremendous predictive and explanatory power. Headlines
suggest that behavior such as infidelity might be in our genes 5 and the media report attempts to
identify the “novelty-seeking gene,” the “homosexuality” gene, and the “aggression” gene. 6
Movies, cartoons, and science fiction also contribute to the notion that a tiny alteration of DNA
determines behavior and traits. 7 These ideas have become part of our language. Not always in
jest, we attribute complex traits and predilections to a single gene – the laziness gene, the
obsessive gene, the gardening gene, the book gene, etc. – as if personal traits could be summed
up neatly in a few thousand base pairs of DNA. 8
If the public believes that genes can reveal one’s propensity to be unfaithful or a
successful gardener, it should be no surprise that the public has great faith in the power of
genetics to heal and cure social ills. Sixty-six percent of respondents in a 1986 Harris poll

James Watson) ; see also id. at 44-46 (In movies such as Blade Runner, and comics like
DNAgents and the X-Men “shared DNA is the essential characteristic defining humanness.”).
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Id. at 57. It promises to explain distinctions among groups and individuals, id. at
102-126, why some people are evil and others aren’t, id. at 83-101 (discussing evil and good
genes); 127-48 (discussing genetics as an alternative explanation for criminal behavior, rather
than poor parenting).
5
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See Keay Davidson, No Easy Link Between Genes, Behavior, SAN. FRAN.
CHRON., Feb. 13, 2001, at A3. These studies and claims have been roundly criticized on
methodological grounds. Behavioral genetics generally is highly controversial politically and
scientifically.
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thought that “genetic engineering” would improve their lives. 9 Each new gene discovery offers
the promise of cures, if not today, in the future. Often in the rush to promote this research, the
media or scientists may leave the public with an inflated sense of genetics’ power to heal. Much
of the public does not understand how far we still are from using our knowledge of genetics to
cure diseases. 10 Moreover, the strong sense of genetic determinism reinforces the misperception
that genetics alone holds the key to eradicating illness, when other important factors, such as
environment and complex multigene interactions, are equally important.
The public’s perception of the power of genetics is not all positive, however. The
horrific abuses of genetics in Nazi Germany and our own deeply problematic history with
eugenics, 11 shroud genetics with a threatening aura. Less than a century ago, eugenics was
viewed as a noble social engineering solution to combat social ills, 12 accepted within popular
culture, 13 and legitimized by legislation in over thirty states prohibiting the “genetically inferior”
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Gene therapy, for example was tout ed as being just around the corner in the mid
1980s. More than fifteen years later, scientists are struggling not only with the technical
challenges of gene therapy, but recently with potential risks in the procedure. See Richard Weiss
& Deborah Nelson, Gene Therapy’s Troubling Crossroads, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1999, at A3;
Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Penn Settles Gene Therapy Suit, WASH POST, Nov. 4, 2000, at
A4; Rick Weiss, FDA Seeks to Penalize Gene Scientist, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2000, at A14.
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“The term ‘eugenics’ was coined by the British scientist and mathematician Sir
Francis Galton in 1883. The word originates from the Greek root for ‘noble or good in birth’”
and was understood as the science of improving the hereditary quality of a race or breed.
Howard Markel, The Stigma of Disease: Implications of Genetic Screening, 93 AM. J. MED.
209, 210-11 (1992).
12

See Paul Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court, 13 J. CONT.
HEALTH L & P OL’ Y 1, 2 (1996) (noting that physicians were the strongest proponents of
eugenics).
13

“Eugenics was not a single idea but a thousand ideas, not a simple, coherent
doctrine but a messy public discussion that served many agendas.” NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note
2, at 20. To understand the eugenics movement, one must consider the “broad popular interest”
in the subject. Id. at 21. The American Eugenics Society sponsored a nationwide system of
“mental and physical perfection contests,” in which babies were judged based on physical
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from reproducing. 14 Indeed, even the Supreme Court, in the now notorious opinion, Buck v.
Bell, 15 promoted the virtues of eugenics when Justice Holmes upheld such a statute on the
grounds that “three generations of imbeciles are enough.” 16
Even our more recent history with genetics is not untarnished. In the 1970s, state
legislatures began to mandate genetic screening of African Americans for sickle cell anemia, an
inherited disease that occurs most commonly in people of African descent. 17 Although the initial
impetus for such legislation came from African American leaders and was grounded in public
health concerns, the legislation proved to be poorly thought out with extreme negative
implications. 18
This unfortunate history contributes to the fears of genetic discrimination, which is very
measurements and physical tests. Similar contests were held at state fairs for “fitter families,” all
with the goal of encouraging the eugenic ideal. Id. at 27.
14

Lombardo, supra note 12, at 5. Eugenics efforts took many forms including the
Federal Immigration Restriction Act, enacted in 1924 “to combat ‘the rising tide of defective
germ-plasm’ carried by suspect groups migrating form Southern and Eastern Europe.” Id.
Eugenics was ostensibly based on legitimate scientific study. In fact, most “genetic” claims were
based on unfounded extrapolations of genetics, poor scientific studies, or sometimes mere
assumptions. Early geneticists grossly overstated the role of genetics with respect to such
characteristics as criminality, laziness, and other moral transgressions. NELKIN & LINDEE, supra
note 2, at 19-37.
15

274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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Id. at 207. This case has never been formally overturned. Moreover, “the validity
of eugenically-founded, hereditary assumptions as a basis for law,” Lombardo, supra note 12, at
19, remains a more or less subtle strand in reproductive rights cases, even as recently as Roe v.
Wade. Id. at 12-24.
17

Markel, supra note 11, at 212.
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Several criticisms were leveled at these statutes (and even those that made genetic
testing voluntary) : the fact that testing was limited to only African Americans, when other ethnic
groups, such as those of Mediterranean origin, can also carry the gene; the “scientific
inaccuracy” of much of the legislation, which led to confusion and stigmatization of unaffected
carriers of the disease gene (those who had one, as opposed to two, copies of the disease gene);
and the lack of protective safeguards to ensure confidentiality of results, genetic counseling, and
education. See id. at 213.
8

much on the minds of Americans. 19 A recent film, GATTACA, taps into this public unease by
describing a world in which “genoism” – discrimination based on genes – is rampant, despite its
illegality. Virtually all choices and options are defined largely in terms of genetic make-up,
which can predict at birth one’s abilities, future diseases, and when one will die. Discrimination,
the narrator tells us, had become a science, leading to a new underclass of “degenerates.”
GATTACA describes precisely the world the public fears could become reality with genetic
technologies. 20
As this admittedly brief and simplified description suggests, 21 the public perceives
genetics as uniquely powerful, both for good and bad. Its strongly deterministic view of genes
intensifies the sense that genetic information is uniquely threatening and susceptible to misuse.
As is developed in more detail below, the media and scientific community contribute to this
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A 1992 Harris poll indicated that 38% of respondents thought that until privacy
concerns had been resolved, genetic testing should be stopped. Another 1992 poll indicated that
99% of respondents did not believe that employers should be able to screen prospective
employees for genetic conditions. The numbers reduced to 60% if the screening was for possible
health risks. In 1993, a Harris/Westin poll showed that 91% of respondents did not believe
genetic information should be used by employers to reduce health benefit costs, and 86%
opposed genetic testing by health insurance companies for underwriting decisions. Reilly, supra
note 8, at 118-19. Interestingly, some of these surveys also show that the majority of employers
and insurers – the entities that most inspire fear of genetic discrimination – do not believe they
should be allowed to discriminate on the basis of genetic information. Id. at 120.
20

A related fear concerns reproductive uses of genetics and other advanced
technologies. In my many discussions about genetics with students or lay people, very little time
passes before they recast their concerns about genetic discrimination as concerns about genetic
selection, genetic enhancement, or cloning. Although most find these technologies repugnant, I
suspect it is not genetics per se that troubles them as much as the tinkering with human
reproduction. In my view, however, it is a mistake to confuse the use of genetic information to
construct a particular kind of individual with using genetic information for insurance or
employment purposes. The two, I believe, raise conceptually, ethically, and scientifically
different issues, which are beyond the scope of this article.
21

I recognize that such a brief discussion cannot capture the complexity and breadth
of views that exist in a pluralistic society such as ours. There is not a single public, nor even a
single popular culture, but instead a complex and overlapping mix of groups within each. How
anyone understands and conceives of genetics has a great deal to do with one’s level and degree
of scientific and general education.
9

perspective.
B.

The Media
The media play a significant role in shaping public perceptions about genetics in large

part because they offer one of the few sources of such information for a public remarkably
uneducated about genetics. Of course, a chicken and egg problem exists. The media’s decisions
about which stories to publish and how to package them are influenced by public attitudes. And
public attitudes are influenced by the stories and manner in which they are told. Whether the
media’s coverage of genetics captures the public’s imagination because of DNA’s sacred role in
our secular society or whether such coverage makes DNA sacred is difficult to unpack.
Whichever element initiated this cycle, one thing is clear: stories about genetics sell. But
more importantly, stories that emphasize the power of genetics sell. In the early days of the
Human Genome Project (prior to 1993!), front-page headlines announced the discoveries of new
genes and the promise of cures for physical and social ills. 22 As the identification of new genes
became almost common place, stories about genetic’s promise lost some of their edge. It was
not long before the media discovered another angle – “how genetics can be used against you.” 23
After a seminal study on genetics discrimination was published in 1992, 24 the perils of genetics
became grist for the media’s mill. 25 Although the media still waxed poetic about genetics’
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See Cystic Fibrosis Gene Possibly Identified, Scientists Report, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Apr. 30, 1987, at A3; Thomas Maugh, Faulty Gene That Causes Gehrig’s Disease
is Found, L.A. TIMES , Mar. 4, 1993, at A1; Thomas Maugh, Genetic Marker Helps Pinpoint
Causes of Huntington’s, L.A. TIMES , Nov. 16, 1987, at 5; See, e.g., Mike Toner, Fragile X Defect
Gene Discovered, ATLANTA J & CONST., May 30, 1991, at A1.
23

Mike Snider, How Genetics Can be Used Against You, USA TODAY, Nov. 17,

1993, at 9D.
24

Paul Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM.
J. HUM . GENET. 476 (1992). The study defines genetic discrimination as “discrimination against
an individual or against members of that individual’s family solely because of real or perceived
differences from the ‘normal’ genome of that individual.” Id. at 477.
25

My research assistant’s LEXIS-NEXIS search for newspaper articles on genetics
discrimination prior to 1993 was unsuccessful. A search for stories from 1993 on yielded more
than 300 hundred articles. In addition, she observed a frequent pattern in which discussions of
10

promise, most stories concluded with strong words of caution about the threats to privacy and
liberty this new technology presents. 26 In particular, articles focused on stories about people
losing health insurance or jobs based on genetic tests or information. In short, the media began
to give an “avalanche of attention [to problems like] genetic discrimination.” 27
The formula for stories on genetics today is captured in the title of a few articles, “The
Promise and Peril” of genetics. 28 This format offers a compelling image of science as deliverer
of good and evil, consistent with the popular culture’s conception of genetics. The media
promise that genetics will both provide ready, potent cures for disease and pose dark threats of
insurance and employment discrimination. The media’s emphasis on both promise and peril,
however, is often overstated and sometimes imprecise, contributing to the public’s sense that
genetics is exceptionally powerful.

the promise of genetic discoveries were followed by concerns regarding discrimination.
26

See, e.g., Richard Saltus, Dana-Farber Launches Cancer Genetics Unit, BOST.
GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1995, at 2 (noting the important role of genetics in cancer, but mentioning that
research participants will have the added worry of discrimination); Rick Weiss, Colon Cancer
Gene Test Still Has a Way to Go, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1993, at Z7 (describing the identification
of the gene associated with inherited colon cancer and concluding with concerns about insurance
discrimination based on the presence of this gene); Thomas Maugh, Unraveling the Secrets of
Genes, L.A. TIMES , Oct. 31, 1993, at A1 (noting the numerous genes that had been discovered by
that point, including cystic fibrosis and Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy, and closing with
concerns about potential discriminatory uses of this information); Lisa Goldstein, If You Knew
Your Child Would be Born Deaf . . . ., SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1999, at A19 (discussing the
advantages of identifying a gene linked to deafness, and ending with a discussion of the possible
discrimination that could result from screening for such traits).
27

Reilly, supra note 8, at 117. So important has this angle on genetics become that
journalists frequently call scholars like Reilly, hoping to identify someone who has been
discriminated against. Id. at 118. Reilly concludes that “journalists are desperate to find . . .
citizens who will make that claim.” Id.
28

Sherman G. Finesilver, The Promise and Perils of Genetics, DENVER ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sep. 6, 1996, at 49A; Susan Ferraro, Promise and Peril in Gene Therapy,
DAILY NEWS, Jun. 4, 2000, a N24; Perry Greenbaum, Promises and Perils: Scientists
Discoveries Cause Delight, Caution as They Decode the Human Genetic Blueprint, THE
GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 1999, at S4; Robert Steinbrook, The Promise and Peril of New Genetic
Screening, L.A. TIMES , Nov. 1, 1993, at A1.
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Genetics is neither as close to curing physical and social ills as the media promises nor as
close to wreaking havoc as it warns. The identification of new genes is still many long and
complicated steps away from the possibility of treatment. Gene therapy, for example, touted as
near success in the mid 1980s, has proven not only elusive but possibly riskier than imagined. 29
In fact, just understanding the role of genes in disease has proven exceedingly complex,
particularly as we identify genes associated with multifactorial conditions (which most medical
conditions are) in which environment and multiple other genes play important and complex
roles. 30
The media exaggerate not only the promise of genetics, but also the threats of genetic
discrimination, which are based on only a few studies. The media and many commentators
interpret these studies as strong evidence of current insurance and employment discrimination
based on genetic information. Yet, inherent methodological problems make it difficult to
conclude much from these studies for several reasons. 31 First, the studies rely only on selfreported incidents of discrimination. 32 The impossibility of confirming the alleged reasons for
denial of insurance or employment limits the data’s persuasiveness. Second, the method of
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See supra note 10.

30

“In the study of human diseases with a genetic component, complexity has
become the rule rather than the exception.” Jon Beckwith & Joseph Alper, Reconsidering
Genetic Antidiscrimination Legislation, 26 J.L. M ED. & ETHICS 205, 208 (1998). Even some of
the apparently most straight-forward genetic diseases have turned out to be far more complex
than imagined. For example, after scientists discovered the gene for cystic fibrosis, a recessive,
inherited condition, they learned that cystic fibrosis gene did not always (as prior understanding
had held) result in cystic fibrosis, but might lead only to infertility or asthma. Gina Kolata,
Cystic Fibrosis Surprise: Genetic Screening Falters, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 16, 1993, at C1. Dr.
Norman Fost concluded that these findings demonstrate that “there is, in fact, no such thing as a
single-gene disorder.” Id. Instead, genes work together with environment in complex ways that
vary from individual to individual.
31

Overcoming these methodological problems would be next to impossible.

32

Two of the most widely cited studies based their conclusions entirely on selfreporting, without any attempt to confirm claims of alleged discrimination. See Reilly, supra
note 8, at 110, 114-115.

12

soliciting survey participants 33 biases the data, making meaningful statistical conclusions
impossible. 34 Finally, the actual number of reported incidents of discrimination represents only a
very small fraction of the surveyed group, 35 giving pause to claims that genetic discrimination is
so widespread.
In the end, these surveys offer only anecdotal accounts of genetic discrimination that
cannot be objectively confirmed or rejected. And indeed, some data – though equally susceptible
to the same methodological attacks – suggest that most insurers and employers are not currently

33

Id.

34

Survey participants were solicited via advertisements in journals and newsletters
for genetics professionals and genetic disease support groups, for example. Reilly, supra note 8,
at 115 (“[N]o attempt was made at random sampling from among that larger cohort.”); Beckwith
& Alper, supra note 30, at 205-206.
35

One commentator concludes that the first and most widely cited study “is
remarkable for how few incidents of genetic discrimination it was able to discover.” Reilly,
supra note 8, at 110 . Solicitations were mailed to 1,119 professionals in genetics or related areas
and to genetics support groups (presumably the most likely to have contact with individuals at
risk of genetic discrimination). Yet, after just over half a year, the research group received only
29 usable responses, reporting 41 incidents of insurance (32 incidents) or employment (7
incidents) discrimination. Id. at 109. Another study conducted four years later, sent survey
instruments to 27,700 individuals who were either at risk of a genetic condition or parents of
children with genetic conditions. Lisa Geller et al., Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions
of Genetic Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis, 2 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 71 (1996).
Nearly 50% (455) of the 917 respondents claimed to have suffered discrimination, which is only
1.7% of the surveyed population. Reilly, supra note 8, at 114.
Of course it is possible that these numbers under-represent the incidence of genetic
discrimination. Under-reporting might occur, particularly among parents of children with
genetic conditions, who may be so fully consumed with the day-to-day tasks of caring for their
children that they simply have no time to answer surveys on discrimination. In addition, having
to mail in replies and do more than just check boxes may have dissuaded some from responding
to surveys. After spending hours battling insurers, one might be understandably reluctant to
write about the experience. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Comments of Philip R. Reilly’s “Genetic
Discrimination,” in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 134-35 (Clarisa Long, ed.,
1999). In the end, it is impossible to determine exactly how to explain the currently low
incidence of accounts of genetic discrimination.
13

using genetic testing or information. 36 That the media significantly overstate the incidence of
genetic risks is not surprising. A nuanced discussion of the methodological limitations of these
studies is far less compelling than descriptions of anecdotal accounts of genetic discrimination.
Instead, the dramatic anecdotes have become rich material for news stories on genetics
discrimination. 37 Americans love to hate their villains, especially when they include large
corporate entities, such as insurance companies, which are already in public disfavor. 38 As a
result, in spite of uncertain evidence of genetic discrimination, virtually all media reports of
genetics describe the risk as currently threatening. These anecdotes touch a chord in a public
already sensitized to the view that genetics concerns are uniquely problematic.
To be fair, even if genetic discrimination is not currently a significant problem, the future
remains uncertain. As our understanding about the clinical significance of various disease genes
increases, genetic tests will improve and become more prevalent and cost-effective. Potentially
vastly increasing numbers of individuals will undergo genetic testing. Insurers and employers

36

See Beckwith & Alper, supra note 30, at 206. A 1983 survey showed that only
6% of 366 large industrial companies had even conducted genetic tests. 1983 OTA Report. A
study conducted ten years later demonstrated that very few life insurers were conducting genetic
tests. Although insurers were interested in existing information of applicants, the survey showed
that little actuarial data existed for underwriting decisions based on genetic information. Jean
McEwen et al., A Survey of Medical Directors of Life Insurance Companies Concerning Use of
Genetic Information, 53 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 33 (1993). Similarly, a survey of insurance
commissioners turned up “only a minuscule number” of complaints regarding genetic
discrimination. Reilly, supra note 8, at 112. One reason for this might be the limited number of
genetic tests currently available and the fairly high cost of genetic testing, which might change in
the future. See infra TAN 38. Another explanation might be employer and insurer norms
against genetic testing and discrimination either because they believe it is morally wrong or
because they are concerned about negative public relations in being perceived as discriminating
based genetics.
37

See David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797 (1998)
(discussing the power of anecdotes to influence and shape public policy).
38

See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong With a Patient
Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 237-244 (2000) (describing the public’s strong dislike,
even hatred, of managed care organizations).
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may be far more interested in using this information as it becomes more meaningful. 39 Although
the actuarial value of this information will likely be weaker than the public imagines, 40 insurers
or employers may still want to use some of this information. 41
Whether genetic discrimination will become problematic in the future is less important
for this discussion than the fact that the media overstate both the promise and current risks of
genetic discrimination, reinforcing genetics exceptionalism.
C.

The Scientific Community
The media are not alone in perpetuating the image of genetics as powerful. In subtle and

less subtle ways, the scientific community has also contributed to this perspective. Funding
decisions, scientists’ genuine interest in minimizing the threats of their technology, and
scientists’ understandable faith in the value of their enterprise reinforce the public’s sense that
genetic information is fraught with risk and full of promise.

39

See Beckwith & Alper, supra note 30, at 206 (noting that as a consequence of
“the availability of a rapidly growing number of genetic tests for a wide variety of diseases . . .
an ever increasing number of people will lose insurance or will not be able to afford the higher
premiums charged because of their genetic susceptibility.”). But see Catherine Arnold, Britain
Backs Insurers’ Use of Genetic Testing, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Nov. 27, 2000, at 10
(describing the decision of the Genetics and Insurance Committee of Britain’s health ministry
not to ask insurers to withdraw the use of test results for HD, although insurers are not permitted
under their code of practice to require such genetic tests). Recently the EEOC alleged that a
company was performing genetic tests, without consent, on employees who filed claims for
work-related injuries based on carpal tunnel syndrome. See Sarah Schafer, EEOC Sues to Halt
Worker Gene Tests, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2001 at A1. The case was ultimately settled. See
infra note 353.
40

Most common chronic diseases are multifactorial, which means that multiple
genes and environment work together in complex ways to create disease. Even genes associated
with increased risks of cancer or other conditions, may prove highly unreliable in predicting the
risks for any individual person, given that so many different mutations exist, and that the same
mutation may express differently from individual to individual. See H. Gilbert Welch & Wylie
Burke, Commentary: Uncertainties in Genetic Testing for Chronic Disease, 280 JAMA 1525,
1526 (1998).
41

Actuarial decision making, for example, is more art than science. See John V.
Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 329 (1997). The few
anecdotal instances of genetic discrimination appear to be based primarily on misconceptions
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One of the more subtle factors influencing the genetics exceptionalism perspective is the
fact that the Human Genome Project has allocated five percent of its $3 billion budget to explore
the ethical, legal and social issues associated with genetics. 42 The inspiration for this remarkable
and novel occurrence in the history of science was undoubtedly mixed. Although legitimate
concern about the social impact of scientific research largely drove this effort, 43 public relations
must also have been a motivator. Whether intentional or not, the plan to set aside a portion of
the Human Genome Project funds for ethical and legal studies was politically astute given the
public’s fears about genetic technologies. 44 Dr. Watson, the first director of the human genome
project office at the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), 45 was certainly aware of the success of
prior “scientific self-policing” efforts in genetics, which many viewed as a model of scientific
integrity. 46 Many regarded the decision as “a laudable willingness to look beyond the laboratory
about the meaning of the data. See Beckwith & Alper, supra note 30, at 206.
42

“The ELSI program budget increased from 3% in fiscal year (FY) 1990 ($1.5
million) to 4.7% in FY 91 to an average of 5.1% in fiscal years 92-95 ($6.3 million in FY
1995).” National Human Genome Research Institute, Review of the Ethical, Legal and Social
Implications Research Program and Related Activities (1990 -1995) at 4 [hereinafter NHGRI,
Review]; Nicholas Wade, Reading the Book of Life: A Historic Quest, N.Y TIMES, Jun. 27, 2000,
at F5 [hereinafter Wade, A Historic Quest] (The allocation was increased from 3 to 5 percent of
the genome project budget.).
43

Certainly, many proponents saw value in preparing society to address the moral,
legal, or social issues the technology might raise – particularly in light of a recent and
problematic past with genetics research in our country and others. See supra TAN 10-18.
44

It is difficult to attribute precise motivations to this decision since Dr. James
Watson first announced the plan in response to an anonymous reporter’s question at a press
conference. Eric T. Juengst, Self-Critical Federal Science? The Ethics Experiment Within the
Human Genome Project, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL’ Y 63, 63, 65 (1996). Whether the question
coincided with his plans or whether it inspired the idea is not clear.
45

Wade, A Historic Quest, supra note 42, at F5.

46

A few decades ago, scientists self-imposed a voluntary moratorium on early
recombinant DNA research in response to public concerns about the dangers of this new
technology. See Juengst, supra note 44, at 68 & n.12. More recently, the scientific community
has adopted another self-imposed moratorium with respect to human reproductive cloning.
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in conducting scientific work, in order to help society craft its science policy.” 47 But the plan
was also met with skepticism, both within and outside the NIH. Some described it as “simply
enlightened scientific self-interest” 48 or “a clever attempt to create a screen of ethical smoke
behind which the Human Genome Project’s juggernaut could build up speed.” 49 Either
description seems simplistic. Undoubtedly both a genuine commitment to consider the social
impact of genetics research and a desire to build public trust so as to maintain continued support
for the Human Genome Project influenced the creation of ELSI. 50
Whatever the motivations, the creation of ELSI and its raison d’etre 51 have inspired a
particular brand of scholarship that contributes to the genetics exceptionalism perspective.
Money allocated for the ethical, legal, and social issues of genetics ultimately encourages
scholarship that identifies genetics issues. 52 Such a focus emphasizes the putative uniqueness of
genetics issues and the fact that genetics raises problems. Even if the scholarship does not
explicitly state that genetics raises distinct issues, 53 the vast number of articles addressing

47

Id. at 68.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 67. One senior NIH official asked Dr. Watson why he wanted “‘to spend all
this money subsidizing the vacuous pronunciamentos of self styled “ethicists”!?’” Id. at 66.
Another response was “‘What’s the big deal about all this ethical and legal stuff?’” Robert Weir,
Why Fund ELSI Projects?, in GENES AND HUMAN SELF-K NOWLEDGE: HISTORICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON MODERN GENETICS 189 (Robert F. Weir et al. eds., 1994).
50

“To the extent that the social environment of genetic research can influence their
work, it makes sense for scientists to pay attention to developing a social context in which
genetic research can flourish.” Juengst, supra note 44, at 68.
51

ELSI’s creation was based on the recognition “that mapping and sequencing the
human genome would have profound implications for individuals, families, and society. . . . and
concern that information would be gained that might result in anxiety, stigmatization and
discrimination . . . .” NHGRI, Review, supra note 42, at 2.
52

“Implications” is after all what the “I” in ELSI stands for.

53

Watson hinted at this fact when he established ELSI, stating that “The
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insurance discrimination, 54 employment discrimination, 55 and privacy56 can leave that
[ethical/social] problems are with us now, independent of the genome program, but they will be
associated with it.” Leslie Roberts, Genome Project Gets Underway at Last, 243 SCI. 167, 16768 (1989). Dr. Eric Juengst, the first director of the ELSI program, notes that many of the
challenges raised by genetics technology have long existed in biomedical research and clinical
care, though he believes that because of “the special public interest and concern . . . need to be
addressed if only for prudential reasons.” Juengst, supra note 44, at 72.
54

See, e.g., Norman Daniels, The Genome Project, Individual Differences and Just
Health Care, in JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME P ROJECT 114-115 (Timothy F. Murphy &
Marc A. Lappé eds. 1994); Alexander K. Glazier, Genetic Predispositions, Prophylactic
Treatments and Private Health Insurance, 23 AM. J. L. & M ED. 45 (1997); Kathy L. Hudson et
al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for Reform, 270 SCIENCE 391
(1995); Nancy E. Kass, The Implications of Genetic Testing for Health and Life Insurance, in
GENETIC SECRETS : PROTECTING P RIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 299 (Mark
A. Rothstein ed., 1997); Thomas H. Murray, Genetics and the Moral Mission of Health
Insurance, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 12; Robert J. Pokorski, Insurance
Underwriting in the Genetic Era, 60 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 205, 208-09 (1997); Karen H.
Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State Legislative Approaches, 23 J.L.
Med. & Ethics 312 (1995).
55

See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
Use of Genetic Testing by Employers, 266 JAMA 1827 (1991); Lori B. Andrews & Ami S.
Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75 (1991);
Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age, 42 VILLANOVA L. REV. 613 (1997);
Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s Fair? 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1646 (1995); Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based
Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & M ED. 109 (1991);
Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace,
3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’ Y 225 (2000); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in
Employment and the American with Disabilities Act, 29 HOUSTON L. REV. 23 (1992).
56

See, e.g., George J. Annas et al., The Genetic Privacy Act and Commentary
(unpublished, D.O.E. No. DE-FG02-93ER6126, Feb. 28, 1995); Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic
Privacy, 23 J.L. M ED. & ETHICS 320 (1995); Ami S. Jaeger & William F. Mulholland, II, Impact
of Genetic Privacy Legislation on Insurer Behavior, 4 GENETIC TESTING 31 (2000); Karen Ann
Jensen, Genetic Privacy in Washington State: Policy Considerations and Model Genetic Privacy
Act, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 357 (1997); Michael M..J. Lin, Note, Conferring a Federal Property
Right in Genetic Material: Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act , 22 AM. J.L. &
MED. 109 (1996); Michael Hugh Miller, III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy,
8 HEALTH MATRIX 179 (1998); William F. Mulholland, II & Ami S. Jaeger, Genetic Privacy and
Discrimination: A Survey of State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 311 (1997); Patricia Roche et
al., The Genetic Privacy Act, 37 JURIMETRICS 1 (1996); GENETIC S ECRETS (Mark Rothstein ed.,
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impression. This effect is magnified by the fact that ELSI funding “represents the largest
expenditure of money for biomedical ethics and health law in the country.” 57 The prospect of an
ELSI grant surely makes genetic issues more enticing to scholars who might otherwise have
focused on other issues in biomedicine and health policy. The research focus is further shaped
by the nature of ELSI’s high priority areas, which during its first five years were privacy and fair
use of genetic information. 58 Not surprisingly, numerous articles soon addressed these concerns,
with particular attention to insurance and employment issues. The influence of ELSI on research
is so strong that some worry it could “distort research in bioethics.” 59
As research focuses on genetics issues, the more trendy the topic becomes; consequently
more is written about it, creating a spiraling effect. Even if all of the scholarship is not explicitly
premised on notions of genetics exceptionalism, 60 the plethora of articles, books, and essays on

1997).
57

Weir, supra note 49, at 189 (noting that the ELSI funds enable “ethicists,
attorneys, and social scientists to have an unprecedented opportunity to do funded research”).
See also NHGRI, Review, supra note 42, at 4.
58

NHGRI, Review, supra note 42, at 1-2. The other three priority areas are
integration of new genetic technologies in clinical care, genetics research issues, and public and
professional education. Id.
59

See George Annas & Sherman Elias, Social Policy Research Priorities for the
Human Genome Project, in GENE MAPPING 275 (George Annas & Sherman Elias eds. 1992)
(quoting Eric Landers, who when asked if the Human Genome Project would distort research for
molecular biology, replied that “It is much more likely to distort research in bioethics”); Juengst,
supra note 44, at 69 (An “ELSI program could distort the research agenda of bioethics, by
attracting scholarly attention to issues that, in the grand scheme of current issues in biomedicine
and health policy, might not merit top priority.”).
60

Indeed a small amount of the scholarship and policy work supported by ELSI is
explicitly opposed to genetics exceptionalism. For example, the Joint NIH-DOE Working Group
on the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI), Task Force on Genetic Information and
Insurance noted that the concerns regarding genetics discrimination in insurance applied equally
to other medical information. NIH-DOE, W ORKING GROUP ON ETHICAL, LEGAL & SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, GENETIC INFORMATION AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC INFORMATION INSURANCE (1993)
http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/About_NHGRI/Der/Elsi/itf.html (visited 6/9/01). In addition, the
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the topic intensifies the media’s attention to genetics issues and public fears about genetics. 61 At
the very least, the fact that so much has been written about genetics and the absence of similar
government programs to study other issues in biomedical research might suggest that something
unique is at stake. 62 Whether or not ELSI was premised on this notion, the effect has been to
promote a discourse that addresses the issues solely in terms of genetics, reinforcing the genetics
exceptionalism perspective among the public, media, and legislators.
Although ELSI may have contributed to this perspective, the genetics research
community has also reinforced the public’s sense of the power and possibility of genetic
information. The very fact that three billion dollars were allocated to decode the human genome
reveals both Congress’s and many scientists’ faith in the great value of genetics research. 63 The

article coining the term “genetics exceptionalism” first appeared in Thomas Murray, Genetic
Exceptionalism and “Future Diaries,” in GENETIC S ECRETS 68 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997), a
book which was funded with an ELSI grant. The examples are minimal, however, when
compared with the vast amount of literature that focuses specifically on genetics concerns.
61

Some worry that ELSI projects can lead to “alarmist hype.” Juengst, supra note
44, at 64. In Watson’s defense of the ELSI project, he noted that the cat – the public’s ethical
concerns about genetics – was already out of the bag, to which one NIH official responded “‘But
why inflate the cat? Why put the cat on TV?’” (quoted in id. at 66); see also id. at 70.
62

My point is not that the creation of ELSI was inherently problematic, for I see the
wisdom of proactive contemplation of the social consequences of new technologies (although I
would question whether such study should be limited only to one new technology). See id. at 7172 (observing that if genetic concerns mirror those in other areas, one conclusion might be to
extend the ELSI approach to all institutes of NIH). One might also wonder whether such
proactive study should be funded by the very entity conducting the research, which creates
disincentives against critiquing the research. See id at 64, 67. Those problems aside, I am
sympathetic to the Catch-22 problem for scientists. To avoid addressing the social and ethical
concerns would be politically unwise and might inspire public mistrust. The public wants to
know that scientists are considering their interests. In trying to allay public fears by studying
these issues, however, they focus attention on the negative implications of a new technology and
may unintentionally validate and strengthen public fears.
63

Some have criticized the big science approach to genetics as creating its own
distortions of biological research. NIH funding in general has increased recently, reflecting
Congress’ and scientists enthusiasm for medical research in general.
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research community’s deep faith in the integrity and value of genetics research and knowledge 64
inspires grandiose claims about genetics in the efforts to promote public support and funding. 65
Scientists’ understandable enthusiasm is often translated by the press as grand promises that
genetics will unravel the mysteries of the body to eliminate illness and even social ills, such as
homelessness. 66 From day one, the scientific community has proselytized the public with
promises of genetics, often recruiting biblical or religious images that infuse the terms “genetic”
and “genes” with mystique and iconic status. 67 These sometimes hyperbolic statements make
good press and shape the public imagery associated with the all-powerful gene.
Consider, as one small example, the way in which this scientific enthusiasm, combined
with media hype, surrounded the completion of the rough draft of the human genome. The
announcement itself was “carefully orchestrated”68 by the leaders of the genome projects both to
show that success had been achieved earlier than expected and to dispel concerns about growing

64

Juengst, supra note 44, at 68 (Whether one accepts the more laudable or more
crass motivation, the rationale for “supporting social-impact studies assumes that the enterprise
of genetic research itself and the knowledge to be generated by it are unalloyed prima facie
goods.”).
65

See Jon Beckwith, The Human Genome Initiative and the Impact of Genetic
Testing and Screening Technologies, 17 AM. J.L. & M ED. 1, 5 (1991).
66

Daniel Koshland, the former editor of SCIENCE, has been frequently cited for his
statement that “[t]he homeless problem is tractable. One third of homeless are mentally ill –
some say 50%. These are the ones who can most benefit from the human genome project.” His
rationale is that mental illness has a genetic basis, and therefore the Human Genome Project can
help us uncover the underlying cause of homelessness. Cited in Jon Beckwith, A Historical View
of Social Responsibility in Genetics, 43 BIOSCIENCE 327 (1993); see also Daniel Koshland,
Sequences and Consequence of the Human Genome, 246 SCI. 189 (1989). Of course this
statement grossly overstates the power of genetics and understates social and environmental
factors in homelessness.
67

See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 2, at 39-41.

68

Paul Jacobs & Aaron Zitner, Genome Milestone, L.A. TIMES , Jun. 27, 2000, at

A1.
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tensions between the private and public research groups. 69 Front page articles adopted the
biblical imagery used by scientists to refer to the human genome, announcing that “scientists
have finished a genetic blueprint of the human body – one of the holy grails of biology – that is
referred to as the Book of Life.”70 The headlines described the work in only the grandest terms:
“Genome Milestone,” 71 and “Reading the Book of Life: A Historic Quest.” 72 Announcements
compared the achievement “to Lewis and Clark’s mapping of the continent” and to Thomas
Jefferson’s meeting with explorer Meriwether Lewis to look at the first crude map of the North
American continent. 73 World leaders likened the achievement to “putting a man on the moon” 74
and “learning the language in which God created life.” 75
This hyperbole was inspired and reinforced by comments from scientists themselves, who
described this as “a historic point in the 100,000-year record of humanity,” 76 “a milestone in
biology unlike any other,” 77 “the first glimpse of our own instruction book, previously known

69

See Eliot Marshall, Talks of Public-Private Deal End in Acrimony, 287 SCI. 1723
(2000); Paul Smaglik, Relations Thaw Between Genome Rivals as Finish Line Draws Near, 405
NATURE 721 (2000).
70

Tim Friend, Genome Projects Complete Sequence, USA TODAY, Jun. 23, 2000, at
1A (emphasis added).
71

Jacob & Zitner, supra note 68, at A1.

72

Wade, A Historic Quest, supra note 42, at F5,

73

Jacobs & Zitner, supra note 68, at A1.

74

Larson et al., The Book of Life, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jun. 27, 2000, at 1A.

75

Nicolas Wade, Reading the Book of Life: The Overview, N.Y.TIMES , Jun. 27,

2000, at A1.
76

Larson et al., supra note 74, at 1A (quoting J. Craig Venter).

77

Natalie Angier, Reading the Book of Life: The Context, N.Y. TIMES , Jun. 27, 2000
at A1 (quoting Francis Collins)
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only to God,”78 and “a revolutionary step for biology . . . the equivalent of getting the structure of
the atom, of getting the periodic table.”79 They promised that this work will “revolutionize” 80
and “have an impact on all aspects of medicine.” 81
Once the final draft was completed, 82 however, the images of the all-powerful gene were
surprisingly absent. Rather than being a “seminal event in scientific reductionism,” 83 the general
tenor of both the media and scientists was considerably more subdued. 84 This was not only
because completion of the final draft was old news after the hoopla surrounding the rough draft,
but also because some surprising discoveries suggested that genes might be less important than
was originally presumed. The human genome, it turns out, comprises closer to 30,000, rather

78

Larson et al., supra note 74, at 1A (quoting Francis Collins)

79

Jeff Ristine, Scientists Giddy at Milestone in Genetic Mapping, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Jun. 24, 2000, at A1.
80

Wade, A Historic Quest, supra note 42, at F1 (quoting Stephen T. Warren, a
medical geneticist at Emory University).
81

Todd Ackerman, Racing to the Finish Line, HOUSTON CHRON., Jun. 26, 2000, at
A1 (quoting George Weinstock, of Baylor College of Medicine). Scientists declared that “[n]ow
scientists everywhere can do a lot of things they couldn’t do before.” Friend, supra note 70, at
1A (quoting Mike Pallazzola, senior director of biosystems at Amgen, Inc.)
82

For some exceptions, see Ronald Kotulak et al., Genome Findings Open “Book of
Life,” CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 2001, at N1 (noting that it would reshape “our view of who we are
and where we come from”); Sarah A. Webster & Darci McConnell, Ethics May Be Research
Victim, DET. NEWS, Feb. 13, 2001, at 6 (“The ethical dilemmas spurred by the genetics
revolution could be unparalleled in the history of human advances.”).
83

Joel Achenbach, Will the Real Genome Please Stand Up?, WASH. POST., Feb. 14,

2001, at C13.
84

Even the stock market’s reaction was tame in comparison to its reaction to the
rough draft announcement. Victoria Griffin, Companies and Markets: Celera Gains on Genome
Release, FIN. TIMES , Feb. 13, 2001, at 17.
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than the expected 100,000 genes; 85 only one inch of the six-foot coil of DNA in each cell
contains the genes that encode a person. 86 Not only is it about twice as large as the roundworm
and fruit fly genomes, it is also more similar to those genomes than anyone expected. 87 These
findings suggest that the complexity of humans must be explained by more than just our genes,
challenging the notion of genetics determinism. As one of the leaders in the race to decode the
genome declared, “[g]enes cannot explain all – or even most – of human biology,”88 or “all of
what makes us what we are.” 89 Of course, it must be noted that as we learn more about genetics,
we are discovering not only the importance of the role of the environment, but also the role of
multigene interactions. In other words, the story has become infinitely more complex than single
genes being fully deterministic. Instead, we must now account for the complex interaction
between environment and multiple genes.
Perhaps these more recent tempered comments and media reports mark a new
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Kotulak et al., supra note 82, at N1; Nicholas Wade, Reading the Book of Life;
Genome’s Riddles, N.Y. TIMES , Feb. 13, 2001, at F1 [hereinafter, Wade, Genome’s Riddles].
86

Rick Weiss, Life’s Blueprint in Less than an Inch, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at

A1.
87

Davidson, supra note 6, at A3; Wade, Genome’s Riddles, supra note 85, at F1.
Only 300 of the 30,000 genes have no counterpart in the mouse genome. Nicholas Wade,
Genome Analysis Shows Humans Survive on Low Numbers of Genes, N.Y. TIMES , Feb. 11, 2001,
at A1, A6. Equally surprising, 223 of our genes appear to come from bacteria. Kotulak et al.,
supra note 82, at N1; Weiss, supra note 86, at A10. This discovery presents an enormous puzzle
for researchers to explain the greater complexity in humans. Wade, Genome’s Riddles, supra
note 85 at F1; Weiss, supra note 86, at A10.
88

Tina Hesman, Age of Discovery Lies Ahead for Researchers of Human Genome,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1 (quoting Craig Venter).
89

Davidson, supra note 6, at A3 (quoting Craig Venter). Although Francis Collins,
the leader of the publicly funded Human Genome Project, disagrees that environment plays a
larger role than inheritance in determining who will get a disease, Hesman, supra note 88, at A1,
he notes that “[u]nderstanding the human genome will not take away the concept of free will . . .
[or] help us very much to understand the spiritual side of human kind or to know who God is, or
what love is,” Tim Radford, Genome Project: Door Opens on Deeper Mysteries, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 12, 2001, at 6.
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circumspection regarding the promise and power of the gene. 90 One can only hope. But it is too
recent to deflect the ways in which the scientific community has contributed to the popular
conception of the gene as uniquely threatening and promising and to the notion that genetics
issues are exceptional.
D.

Legislators
Just as the public, the media, and scientists, are informed by and help shape notions about

the power and threat of genetics, so too do legislators. On the one hand, genetics legislation is
undoubtedly inspired by widespread support from virtually all sectors – the public, media,
researchers, clinical geneticists, and ethicists. 91 Much of the legislation reflects and reinforces
the public’s concern about genetic discrimination, particularly with respect to insurance and
employment. For example, New Jersey’s “Genetic Privacy Act” declares among other things,
that the improper disclosure of genetic information “can lead to significant harm to the
individual, including stigmatization and discrimination in areas such as employment, education,
health care and insurance.” 92 On the other hand, legislators also shape the perceptions of other
institutions. Genetics legislation makes legal the distinctions between genetic and other medical
information that the public perceives, the media reinforce, and that scientists unwittingly
emphasize.
Although genetics legislation has been in place since the 1970s in a few states, it was not
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Many articles quoted scientists as urging the public not to expect cures too soon.
See, e.g., Ralph Brave, Gene Medicine Must Be For All, BALT . SUN, Feb. 13, 2001, at 15A (“We
must set realistic expectations that the most important benefits will not be reaped overnight.”)
(quoting researchers who led the Human Genome Project).
91

One of the only detractors is the insurance industry, which has lobbied heavily to
try to limit the scope of genetics-specific legislation. But even that industry seems willing to
strike some sort of compromise by allowing legislation that protects genetic information, defined
as narrowly as possible. Insurers are also willing to sacrifice the right to require genetic testing
as long as they have the ability to use information that is known to the applicant, otherwise they
fear the problem of adverse selection. Cf. Steven E. Zimmerman, The Use of Genetic Tests and
Genetic Information by Life Insurance Companies, 2 GENETIC TESTING 3 (1998).
92

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-44 (2)(c) (2000); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 659.705(1)(c)

(1999).
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until the 1990s, coincident with increasing scholarly and media attention to genetic
discrimination, that genetics legislation expanded in scope and number. The initial genetics
legislation was narrow, focusing primarily on genetic information associated with specific
diseases. 93 In the 1990s, states began to impose more sweeping legislation. The protected
information was no longer disease specific, but more general genetic information. The efforts
have spread like wildfire, particularly at the state level, where forty-four states have enacted
some form of genetics legislation. No federal genetics legislation has succeeded in spite of
numerous attempts since 1995. Because genetics legislation is the most vivid embodiment of
genetics exceptionalism, it is instructive to survey briefly the nature and scope of genetics
legislation and bills at the state and federal levels, respectively. The overview below focuses
primarily on state legislation, with a brief discussion of federal bills, since it is only at the state
level where genetics legislation has actually been enacted.
Legislators use two approaches to address the threat prevent of genetic discrimination: 1)
direct prohibitions of discrimination or 2) the creation of privacy protections for genetic
information. The first approach – nondiscrimination legislation – is the most common. Fortyfour states prohibit health insurers from discriminating based on genetic information, 94 and
twenty-two prohibit employers. 95 The approaches vary considerably. Some statutes prohibit
insurers or employers from obtaining genetic information in connection with insurance or
employment decisions. For example, they might forbid insurers or employers from requiring
that applicants take genetic tests or disclose the results of genetic tests or other genetic
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For example, some states prohibited insurance decisions based on sickle cell or
Tay Sachs trait. See Karen Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State
Legislative Approaches, 23 J.L. Med. & Ethics 312, 313 (1995); Kathy Hudson, Genetic
Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for Reform, 270 SCI. 391 (1995). The
goal of this legislation was to prohibit decisions based on genetic information that was not
predictive of future illness. Jacobi, supra note 41, at 331. Someone with Tay Sachs or sickle
cell trait carries a single recessive gene and therefore does not and will not develop the condition.
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State Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm (visited 3/13/01).
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State Genetic Nondiscrimination in Employment Laws,
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information. Some statutes prohibit particular uses of genetic information in insurance or
employment decisions. They might for example forbid insurers96 from using genetic information
to make decisions about enrollment, renewal of policies, rates, and/or coverage. They might also
forbid employers from using such information to hire or promote employees, assign benefits, or
determine work assignments.
States vary greatly in their approach toward nondiscrimination in insurance. Some states,
like Minnesota, combine prohibitions against obtaining and using genetic information. Its
“Genetic Discrimination Act” statute prohibits health insurers from 1) requiring an applicant or
his/her blood relative to take a genetic test, 2) inquiring as to whether the individual or relatives
took or refused a genetic test, 3) inquiring as to the results of any genetic tests, or 4) considering
the fact that a genetic test was taken or refused by an individual or blood relative when
“determining eligibility for coverage, establishing premiums, limiting coverage, renewing
coverage, or any other underwriting decision . . . in connection with the offer, sale, or renewal of
a health plan.” 97 In contrast, Michigan takes a narrower approach, prohibiting health insurers
from requiring genetic tests or disclosure of test results or the fact that a test has been
performed. 98 The legislation does not, however, prohibit any particular use of known genetic
information. Illinois will allow insurers to consider genetic information for insurance purposes,
but only if “the individual voluntarily submits the results and the results are favorable to the
individual.” 99 Some states, such as Vermont, ban genetic discrimination by insurers unless there
is an actuarial basis, i.e., “a relationship between the medical information and the cost of the

http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (visited 3/13/01).
96

Most of the insurance legislation applies only to health insurance and some
applies to disability, long-term care, and/or life insurance.
97

MINN. STAT. § 72a.139 (3) (2000).

98

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 3407b(1) (2000).

99

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 410, para. 513/5 (2000).
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insurance risk that the insurer would assume by insuring the proposed insured.” 100
Genetic nondiscrimination laws in employment also vary in their scope. All laws
prohibit discrimination based on the results of genetic tests. 101 Some prohibit employers from
both obtaining and using genetic information for employment decisions. Massachusetts’
legislation is expansive in its approach. Like some other statutes, it applies not only to
employers, but also to employment agencies, labor organizations, and licensing agencies. 102 It
also imposes broad restrictions on these entities’ ability to obtain genetic information. They may
not request, solicit, or inquire about genetic information; require or induce the disclosure of
genetic information; inquire about the genetic information of someone’s family members or
previous genetic testing; or require, administer, or induce someone to undergo genetic testing.
Similarly, employers are banned from using genetic information for a wide range of purposes,
including
to refuse to hire or employ, represent, grant membership to, or license a person on the
basis of that person's genetic information; . . . to affect the terms, conditions,
compensation or privileges of a person's employment, representation, membership, or the
ability to obtain a license; [or to] terminate or refuse to renew a person's employment,
representation, membership, or license on the basis of a genetic test or other genetic
information. 103
Illinois, in contrast, merely requires employers to “treat genetic testing information in such a
manner that is consistent with the requirements of federal law, including but not limited to the
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VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4724 (2000)
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State Genetic Nondiscrimination in Employment Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (visited 3/13/01).
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MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B (2000).

103

Id.
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Americans with Disabilities Act” (“ADA”). 104 Missouri does not prohibit employers from
requiring genetic tests or requesting, requiring, or obtaining genetic information. Instead, it
forbids particular uses of genetic information or genetic test results: to “distinguish between,
discriminate against, or restrict any right or benefit otherwise due or available to such employee
or prospective employee.” Moreover, it does not prohibit “[u]nderwriting in connection with
individual or group life, disability income or long-term care insurance,” or the “use of genetic
information when such information is directly related to a person's ability to perform assigned
job responsibilities.” 105
The second and often overlapping approach to prevent genetic discrimination is through
the enactment of genetic privacy statutes, some version of which exists in twenty-one states. 106
Often, but not always, these privacy protections are integrated with nondiscrimination
legislation. 107 The key to the privacy legislation is to give control to the source of genetic
information by requiring consent for various uses of genetic information: to perform or require a
genetic test, to obtain genetic information, to retain genetic information, and/or to disclose
genetic information. 108 Twenty states require consent at least for disclosure of genetic
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ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 410, para. 513/5 (2000).
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MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1306 (2000).

106

State Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (visited 3/14/2001).
107

See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10149.1 (West 2000).
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Many states provide exceptions for this requirement. They often do not require
consent when genetic information is obtained, retained, transmitted or used to identify someone
in criminal investigations; to maintain a DNA databank for law enforcement purposes when the
person has been convicted of a felony; to identify deceased people; to establish paternity; to
screen newborns for genetic conditions; to determine damage awards in court proceedings; by
medical repositories, for research purposes, if one’s identity is not disclosed, or for emergency
medical treatment. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(C)(Michie 2000).
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information to third parties. 109 At one end of the spectrum, some states 110 like Colorado require
written consent only for disclosure of genetic information to third parties. 111 At the other end of
the spectrum, New Mexico requires consent for disclosure, as well as to obtain and retain genetic
information and to do genetic analysis. Moreover, it requires informed, written consent. 112 In
addition, New Mexico is one of four states that requires personal access to one’s genetic
information. 113 Five states – Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Oregon – protect
genetic privacy by declaring that genetic information is the “unique” or “exclusive” property of
the individual to whom the information pertains. 114 Oregon is the only state to proclaim that one
also has a property right in one’s genetic samples. 115 Most of the states with privacy legislation
impose specific penalties for unlawful disclosure, 116 including civil 117 and criminal penalties. 118
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State Genetic Privacy Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (visited 3/14/2001).
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California, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Virginia. See id.
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COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(3)(a) (2000) (deeming genetic testing
information “confidential and privileged”).
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N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3 (A), (B) (Michie 2000).
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See also Delaware, Nevada, New Mexico, and Oregon.
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COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (1)(a) (“unique property”); F LA . STAT. ch.
760.40 (2)(a) (2000) (“exclusive property”); GA . CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2000) (“unique
property”); LA . REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:213.7(E) (West 2000) (“property”); OR. REV. STAT. §§
659.700(1)(b) (1999) (genetic information is “uniquely private and personal” and is the property
of the person to whom it belongs, except for the purposes of anonymous research).
115

OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.700(1)(b) (1999). Oregon’s recently appointed task force
recommended elimination of this provision. ASSURING GENETIC P RIVACY IN OREGON, Nov. 15,
2000.
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California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont. See State Genetic Privacy Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (visited 3/14/2001).

30

Although no federal genetics legislation has been enacted to date, several federal bills
concerning genetic nondiscrimination and privacy have been introduced in the House or Senate
since 1995. 119 In the 104th , 105th , and 106th Congresses, seven, 120 nine, 121 and eight bills,122
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See e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10149.1(b) (West 2000) (imposing civil penalties of no
more than $1,000 plus court costs for negligent and unauthorized disclosure of genetic
information); CAL. INS. CODE § 10149.1(c) (West 2000) (imposing civil penalties between
$1,000 and $5,000 plus court costs for willful and unauthorized disclosure).
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See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10149.1(d) (West 2000) (One who negligently or
wilfully discloses identifying genetic information that “results in economic, bodily, or emotional
harm to the subject of the test is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in a
county jail for a period not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars
($10,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.”).
119

In the 101st and 102nd Congresses, Representative Conyers introduced the Human
Genome Privacy Act, which would regulate the disclosure of genetic information identifiable to
a specific individual. H.R. 5612, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (2000); H.R. 2045, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
120

Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 1898, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1996) (Pete Domenici); The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, S.
1416, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Mark Hatfield); The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination
Act of 1995, 104th Cong., H.R. 2690, 1st Sess. (1995) (Clifford Stearns); The Genetic Fairness
Act of 1996, 104th Cong., S. 1600, 2d Sess. (1996) (Dianne Feinstein); The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1995, H.R. 2748, 104th Cong., 1st Sess (1995)
(Louise Slaughter); The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of
1995, S. 1694, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Olympia Snowe); H.R. 3477, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996) (Joseph Kennedy).
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Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, S. 422, 105th Cong.,
1 Sess. (1997) (Pete Domenici); Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R.
2198, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (Clifford Stearns); The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, H.R. 306, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997)
(Louise Slaughter); The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of
1997, S. 89, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (Olympia Snowe); Genetic Information Health
Insurance Discrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 328, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (Gerald Solomon);
The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 341, 105th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1997)
(Clifford Stearns); Genetic Protection in Insurance Coverage Act, H.R. 2216, 105th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1997) (Joseph Kennedy); The Genetic Justice Act, S. 1045, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997)
(Tom Daschle); Genetic Nondiscrimination in the Workplace Act, H.R. 2215, 105th Cong., 1st
st
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respectively, were introduced. At this point in the 107th Congress, 3 genetics-specific bills have
been introduced, two in the Senate and one in the House. 123
This session, for example, Senator Thomas Daschle and Representative Louise Slaughter
have introduced parallel bills in the Senate and House, entitled “Genetic Nondiscrimination in
Health Insurance and Employment Act.” 124 These bills follow the state model in several
respects. First, they prohibit insurers from using “protected genetic information concerning an
individual in the group (or information about a request for or the receipt of genetic services by
such individual or family member of such individual)” to make decisions about an individual’s
eligibility in a group or individual health plan or to adjust premium or contribution rates on the

Sess. (1997) (Joseph Kennedy).
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Genetic Information Health Insurance Nondiscrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 293,
106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) (John Sweeney); Genetic Information Health Insurance
Nondiscrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 306, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) (Louise Slaughter);
Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, H.R. 2457, 106th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) (Louise Slaughter); Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1999,
H.R. 2555, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) (Cliff Stearns); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
in Health Insurance Act of 1999, S. 543, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) (Olympia Snowe); Genetic
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, S. 1322, 106th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1999) (Thomas A. Daschle); S. Amdt 3688 to H.R. 4577, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000)
(Thomas A. Daschle) (prohibiting health insurance and employment discrimination based on
genetic information); S. Amdt. 3691 to H.R. 4577, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000) (James M.
Jeffords) (prohibiting health discrimination on the basis of genetic information or genetic
services).
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Genetic and Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act, S. 318,
107 Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) (Tom Daschle ); Genetic and Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance
and Employment Act, H.R. 602, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) (Louise Slaughter); and Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 2001, S. 382, 107th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2001) (Olympia Snowe).
th

124

See S. 318, 107th Cong., 1st Session § 714 (2001) (amending the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Public Health Service Act, and the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act); H.R. 602, 107th Cong., 1st
Session § 714 (2001) (amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the
Public Health Service Act, and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act).
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basis of such information. 125 In addition, the bills would limit insurer access to genetic
information by prohibiting insurers from requesting, requiring, collecting, or purchasing such
genetic information from an individual or a family member; from disclosing such genetic
information without authorization; or from requesting or requiring individuals or family
members to undergo genetic testing. 126
Similarly, the bills prohibit genetic employment discrimination by making it unlawful for
employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment of the individual [or otherwise deprive an individual of employment opportunities] ,
because of protected genetic information with respect to the individual or information about a
request for or the receipt of genetic services by such individual or family member of such
individual.” Paralleling the insurance prohibitions, the bills also forbid employers from
requesting, requiring, collecting, or purchasing such genetic information from an individual or
family member, though several exceptions apply. 127 In addition, the employer may not disclose
such genetic information to third parties unless the disclosure is to an occupational or other
health researcher, under compulsion of a federal court order, or to officials investigating
compliance with the Act. 128 Finally, cognizant of the numerous states genetics laws, the bills
emphasize that the federal law would not supersede any provision of state law that more
completely “protects the confidentiality of [such] genetic information . . .; or prohibits
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Id.

126

Id.
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The exceptions include: 1) when the information is used for “genetic monitoring
of biological effects of toxic substances in the workplace” and the employee has given voluntary,
written authorization, is informed of monitoring results, and the employer receives the results in
“aggregate terms that do not disclose the identity of specific employees”; 2) where the employer
offers genetic services and only the employee or family member receives the results or such
services; or 3) when an employer, after making a conditional offer of employment, requests,
requires or collects medical information, as allowed under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990. Id.
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discrimination on the basis of genetic information than [the federal legislation would.”
Most of this enacted or proposed state and federal genetics legislation embodies the
notion of genetics exceptionalism, either directly or indirectly. 129 Some statutes explicitly
declare the uniqueness of genetic information. For example, the legislative findings of Oregon’s
“Genetic Privacy” statute state that “genetic information is uniquely private and personal
information.” 130 In addition, many statutes emphasize various features of genetic information
that warrant legislative protection: DNA “contains information about an individual's probable
medical future,” 131 improper use of “genetic information can lead to . . . stigmatization and
discrimination in areas such as employment, education, health care and insurance,” 132 genetic
analysis may reveal information about one’s blood relatives, 133 and public fears of genetic
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Id.
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Id. As will be discussed in more detail in Part III.C, Congress has enacted the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 262(a), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), which
eliminates the use of medical information (including genetic information) for the underwriting of
group insurance plans. At this point, this statute provides the best protection against genetic
nondiscrimination, but manages to do so while avoiding genetics exceptionalism, thereby killing
the proverbial two birds with one stone. See infra TAN 340-343.
130

See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.705(1)(b) (1999). See also, Beckwith & Alpert,
supra note 30, at 208 (quoting Senator Domenici’s proposed legislation). Some of the statutes
that create property rights describe genetic information as one’s unique property. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (1)(a) (“unique property”); F LA . STAT. ch. 760.40 (2)(a) (2000)
(“exclusive property”); GA . CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2000) (“unique property”).
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OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.705(1)(a) (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-44 (2)(a) (West

132

OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.705(1)(c) (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-44 (2)(c) (West
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OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.705(1)(d) (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-44 (2)(d) (West

2000).

2000).

2000).
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discrimination deter many from seeking genetic testing. 134
Although these statements do not necessarily imply that the legislators consider genetic
information exceptional, the enactment of genetics-specific legislation is consistent with a view
of genetics as exceptional. It is one thing to argue in the abstract that genetic information
requires protection; it is quite another to draft legislation that creates special protections only for
this kind of information. Moreover, even if not all legislators are motivated by genetics
exceptionalism concerns, the legislation may well be perceived by the public as evidence that
genetic information is inherently and uniquely problematic.
As we have seen, the various concerns and interests of the public, the media, the
scientific community, and legislators create a perpetual cycle that reinforces genetics
exceptionalism. As legislatures enact more genetics statutes, the more attention the media
devote to genetics issues, and the more concerned the public becomes. As a result, scientists and
the public mount pressure for other legislatures to follow suit. As more such legislation is
enacted, it lends authority to and reinforces the widely held view that genetics requires special
protections by creating a legal distinction between genetic and other information, inspiring more
fear and so on. In the end, genetics exceptionalism comes full circle, continuously reinforcing
itself.
Part II. Nondiscrimination, Privacy, and the Under- and Over-Inclusiveness of Genetic
Information
Genetics legislation, intentionally or not, reinforces the idea that genetics raises unique
concerns deserving of special protections. Genetic concerns regarding discrimination and
privacy, however, are not exceptional. The presumption that genetic information is unique is
severely tested by the fact that no sharp line divides genetic from non-genetic information.
Instead, there is a great deal of overlap between these categories, making line-drawing
exceedingly difficult. This problem raises the larger question of whether something morally
relevant about the category of genetic information warrants attempts to distinguish it from nongenetic information. Or to put it differently, is there any difference between genetic and non-
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ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 410, para. 513/5(2) (2000).
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genetic information that makes a difference? This article argues there is not. When one
examines the rationales for genetics legislation one quickly discovers that the category of genetic
information is over- and under-inclusive with respect to those goals. Virtually all of the
arguments for protecting genetic information apply equally to a great deal of non-genetic
information. This under-inclusiveness is much more serious than the over-inclusiveness because
it results in grave inequities between individuals and among classes. Although legislative underinclusiveness is plausibly defended by the strategy of incrementalism, 135 that strategy is unlikely
to succeed in this context, raising equal protection concerns that will be discussed in Part III.
A.

Difficulties in Defining Genetic Information
The first chink in the armor of genetics exceptionalism appears when one tries to define

the genetic information that should receive special legislative protections. This task has proven
more challenging than those who presume genetic information is unique might expect. Indeed it
is virtually impossible fully to distinguish genetic information from other medical information. 136
As one commentator notes, efforts “to separate genetic information from all other medical
information” are doomed to failure 137 because the distinction between these two types of
information is “fallacious.” 138 Genetic information and medical information are “so intimately
intertwined that they cannot be segregated legislatively or by regulation in any way that would
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This strategy has received little attention in the scholarship on genetics legislation,
though it is a defense often uttered in backroom discussions about genetics legislation.
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See Beckwith & Alper, supra note 30, at 206; Mark A. Rothstein, Why Treating
Genetic Information Separately is a Bad Idea, 44 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 33, 35 (1999); Michael S.
Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERK. TECH. L.J. 653, 659-62 (1998); Sonia Suter et
al., Challenges in Drafting, in MAPPING PUBLIC POLICY FOR GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES 5-4 (1998).
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David Korn, Genetic Privacy, Medical Information Privacy, and the Use of
Human Tissue Specimens in Research, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 40-41
(Clarisa Long, ed., 1999) (noting that “it has been too readily taken as given that genetic
information is unique and different in kind from all other forms of private, sensitive, and often
predictive information that may exist in a medical record.”).
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Id. at 40.
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prove operationally feasible.” 139 As we shall see, the various attempts to define genetic
information so as to distinguish it from other medical information are inevitably unsatisfactory,
suffering from under- or over-inclusiveness.
Some legislation uses very tight and narrow definitions, such as, “the results of a genetic
test” 140 or “DNA analysis.” 141 But not all genetic information comes from genetic tests or DNA
analysis. Indeed, of the over 10,000 catalogued genetic diseases, 142 genetic tests exist for only a
few hundred. 143 Most genetic information, at this point at least, comes from clinical evaluations,
non-genetic tests, and family and medical history. As a result, those narrow definitions are
under-inclusive, leaving unprotected a great deal of relevant and significant genetic information.
For example, a family history of Huntington’s Disease (“HD”), which indicates a 50% risk of the
condition144 and is precisely the kind of predictive information that people want to protect, would
not fall within the legislatively protected class of information. 145
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Id. at 24.
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See e.g., TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 9031 (Vernon 2000); GA . CODE ANN. § 335554-3(b) (2000).
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See, e.g., F LA . STAT. ANN. ch. 760.40(2)(a) (West 2000).
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Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.gov/OMIM.
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See Jaeger & Mulholland II, supra note 56, at 31 (“noting that hundreds of genetic
tests are clinically available).
144

For example, if your father and sibling have Huntington’s disease, you have a
50% risk of carrying the gene and ultimately developing the condition.
145

See Suter et al., supra note 136, at 5-4. Earlier genetics legislation tended to
focus on the narrower definition, protecting information based on the results of genetic tests or
the fact that a genetic test had been performed. See, e.g., W IS. STAT. ANN.§ 631.89(2)(c)-(d)
(West 2000) (prohibiting insurers from conditioning insurance coverage, rates, or other benefits
on “whether an individual or a member of an individual’s family, has obtained a genetic test or
what the results of the test, if obtained by the individual or a member of the individual’s family,
were”). Over the last decade, the definition of genetic information has broadened to include
other sources of genetic information such as non-genetic laboratory tests, medical examinations,
37

To solve this problem, some legislatures use broader definitions, such as “information
about genes, gene products, or inherited traits that may derive from an individual or family
member.”146 These definitions would include a family history of HD, but they are overinclusive, protecting more information than was intended, such as information about height, eye
color, and sex, all of which are primarily genetic traits. Though they are genetic, they do not
include the kind of information one views as particularly sensitive. Moreover they include
information about conditions like heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and some mental illnesses,
which have a genetic component, even though we don’t tend to think of them as genetic per se
(and legislators probably did not intend to include them). 147
What one discovers in trying to draw the line between genetic and non-genetic
information is that the line is particularly blurry. Genes play some role in all disease, but
environment plays a role as well, even with genetic diseases. The difference is merely the degree
to which each plays a role. 148 AIDS and phenylketonuria (PKU) illustrate this point nicely.
AIDS is a classic non-genetic condition caused by infection with HIV. Yet genetics is crucial
with respect to whether the infection will cause illness, 149 how soon one becomes ill, and how

and genetic histories. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1-51 (2000).
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See, e.g., S. 318, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 714(e)(6), 2707(i)(16), 9813(c)(7),
104(C) (2001); H.R. 602, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 714(e)(6), 2707(i)(16), 9813(c)(7), 104(C)
(2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1-51 (2000); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17B:30-12(3)(e)(2) (West 2000);
Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-508.4 (Mich. 1996). The trend has been moving in the direction of these
broader definitions. See Jacobi, supra note 41, at 331-33.
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See Suter et al., supra note 136, at 5-4.
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Of course, it is important to note that not only do single genes play a role mixed
with environment, but also that there are complex gene-gene interactions at work as well. See
supra TAN 29-30.
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Studies suggest the “risk of progressing quickly or slowly is determined largely
by [one’s] genetic endowment and not the virulence of the infecting virus or the health and
robustness of their immune systems.” http://www.amaassn.org/special/hiv/newsline/special/jamadb/hla1.htm.
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quickly the disease progresses. 150 Conversely, PKU, a classic genetic condition, caused by two
recessive non-functional genes, is highly influenced by environmental factors. If you eliminate
phenylalanine from the diet, PKU will not develop. 151 These points demonstrate how difficult it
is to divide up the world into what is genetics and what is not.
Although no sharp line divides genetic from non-genetic information, one might argue
that we can nevertheless identify distinctions at the extremes. In other words a spectrum of
medical information exists: at one end lie conditions in which genetics plays a major role
(Huntington’s disease, for example) and at the other end, conditions in which genetics plays a
minor role (AIDS and other infectious diseases, for example). We often draw lines between
extremes, even if fuzziness exists at the margins. In the abortion context, for example, the law
and many ethicists make a morally coherent distinction between viable and non-viable fetuses.
Even though the fetus just days shy of viability is barely distinguishable from the fetus just days
after viability, stark qualitative and moral differences exist between the 9-month-old fetus and
the preembryo, which justify this line drawing. Similarly, one might argue, Huntington’s disease
looks markedly different from AIDS, even if only in the degree to which genetics plays a role.
Why not then borrow from the abortion model and draw lines between what is more and less
genetic?
One reason is that most medical conditions about which we are concerned do not fall at
either end of the spectrum. Instead, most conditions lie awkwardly in the middle. Huntington’s
disease is the rarity, whereas cancer, heart disease, and numerous other conditions that affect vast
numbers of individuals lie within the fuzzy margins where both genes and environment play a
large, complicated, and interrelated role. 152
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Jay Ingram, Reflections on a Bleak Anniversary, TORONTO STAR, Jun. 3, 2001, at
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Steven Zimmerman deserves credit for this apt comparison between HIV and
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PKU.
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Much of the debate in the genetics context has focused on presymptomatic,
predictive information about conditions like Huntington’s disease or inherited forms of cancer.
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The fact that the bulk of information about which we are concerned lies in that murky
middle range raises a second, larger concern. Is there is a principled reason for drawing such a
line? The distinction between the non-viable and viable fetus is morally significant, which is
why it makes sense to draw a line along the slippery slope. 153 Does a similarly meaningful
distinction exist between the two ends of the more-or-less genetic spectrum? Without one, any
line drawn between genetic and non-genetic information will be arbitrary. Section B considers
that problem by assessing whether the rationales for genetics legislation provide a principled
reason for distinguishing between genetic and non-genetic information. It concludes that the
category of genetic information is problematic on several grounds.
B.

Genetic v. Non-Genetic Information – Does the Difference Make a Difference?
Various persuasive arguments can be made for protecting genetic information. But this

fact alone does not offer a principled account for protecting only genetic information (or indeed
for protecting all genetic information). The real issue is whether these arguments apply only to
genetic information. 154 After examining the different rationales that motivate genetics
But whether or not the focus is on the presymptomatic or symptomatic state, the conditions about
which people are concerned – cancer, for example – do lie more in the middle of the genetic/nongenetic spectrum because genes and environment play a role in the development of disease.
153

The viability line used in the abortion context is grounded in principles that
address the conflicting interests of mother, state, and fetus. Prior to viability, the Supreme Court
has held that the state’s interests are not sufficiently weighty for the state to impose an “undue
burden” on the woman’s constitutional liberty interest. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). Though there may be some disagreement
about whether to use the “undue burden” test or strict-scrutiny analysis, a powerful, moral
argument can be made for drawing the viability line in the abortion context.
154

Recently some have suggested they are not persuaded by some those arguments.
See, e.g., Beckwith & Alper, supra note 30, at 207-08; Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge,
Jr., Genetics Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS 21, 3136 (1999); Trudo Lemmens, Selective Justice, Genetic Discrimination, and Insurance: Should
We Single Out Genes in Our Laws?, 45 MCGILL L.J. 347 (2000); Murray, supra note 60, at 66;
Rothstein, supra note 136, at 33. Although this piece builds on some of their criticisms of
genetics exceptionalism, it is the only article to address all three areas of concern – insurance
discrimination, employment discrimination, and privacy. It also goes further in explicitly
illustrating the ways in which the arguments in favor of genetics exceptionalism are over- or
under-inclusive. More important, it describes the moral and policy consequences of the problem
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legislation, this section argues that they do not apply to all genetic information, but more
important, they apply equally to other types of medical information. In short, there is a grossly
imperfect fit between the justifications for carving out special protections for genetic information
and the category of genetic information: genetic information is both over- and under-inclusive
with respect to its legislative purposes. This imprecise fit, particularly the under-inclusiveness,
suggests that the line between genetic and non-genetic information is questionable.
To some extent, any rule or law suffers from these problems. Rules and laws require
classifications of the prohibited action or protected entity. Some imprecision is inevitable
because laws depend on generalizations to reflect the properties or criteria to which they are
intended to apply. 155 One might in theory want precise legislation that describes in excruciating
detail the criteria and properties relevant to its purposes. But it is ultimately impractical and
virtually impossible to craft rules or laws that articulate for all times and circumstances the
specific criteria or properties relevant to the rule’s justifications. Instead, lawmakers must rely
on a generalizing factual predicate to capture the properties relevant to the law’s justifications. 156
Although under- and over-inclusiveness is inherent in rule or law making, 157 it is not
necessarily a fatal flaw. Indeed, we tolerate some amount of imprecision in laws because of the
compensating virtues of reliance, efficiency, predictability and determinacy. 158 In some
instances, however, over-and under-inclusion can be problematic. For example, overof under-inclusiveness. In particular, unlike other articles on genetics exceptionalism, this piece
describes in detail and challenges the incrementalism argument. Moreover, it fully develops the
problems of unintended inequities between individuals and introduces the problem of class
inequities resulting from genetics legislation. Finally, it provides a novel, legal, moral, and
policy argument based on equal protection values for broadening the protections of genetic
information to include medical information.
155

FREDERICK S CHAUER, P LAYING BY THE RULES : A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 17-34 (1991).
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Id. at 34-35.
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Id. at 31-34.
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Id. at 139.
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inclusiveness of speech restrictions may raise First Amendment problems, and underinclusiveness in legislation, may sometimes raise Equal Protection problems. To assess the
propriety of legislation that only protects genetic information, we must consider the degree of
over- and under-inclusiveness, and the interests they implicate. As this section will show,
although some degree of over-inclusiveness exists with genetic information, the costs are small
and legislative definitional fine-tuning can minimize the problem to some extent. The real
concern, however, is the under-inclusiveness of genetic information, which applies to virtually
every justification. Although Section C considers the possible defense of incrementalism, it
expresses skepticism about that strategy in this context. Part III then turns to the serious
normative and policy implications of this under-inclusiveness when analyzed under the lens of
equal protection theory.
1.

Rationales for Genetics Legislation
Although numerous rationales motivate genetics legislation, they can be divided into two

categories: concerns related to genetic discrimination and concerns related to privacy interests.
The most frequent justification for this legislation is to prevent genetic discrimination. At heart,
this is a fairness argument. We cannot control the genes we inherit. Like race, our genetic
information is an immutable trait, for which we should not be penalized. 159 Many believe that
allowing insurers, employers, or other groups to discriminate on the basis of genetic information
compounds personal misfortunes outside our control. 160 They contrast genetic risk factors with
those we can control, such as smoking, speeding, or drinking, the burdens of which many believe
we should bear.
Genetic discrimination is also a concern because certain characteristics of genetic
information make it particularly vulnerable to insurance or employment discrimination. It is
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See Jacobi, supra note 41, at 336.

160

Mark Hall, Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information, 37 JURIMETRICS 13, 16 (1996),
Murray, supra note 60, at 66.
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“like a future diary” that predicts one’s “likely health future.” 161 Indeed, it can be highly
predictive. If you have the gene for Huntington’s disease, for example, you will almost certainly
develop the disease if you live long enough. Others worry that genetic information is prone to
discrimination because it can be misunderstood. 162 Our problematic history with genetics only
intensifies these fears. 163
Another justification for genetics legislation is to allay public concerns. Some have
argued that public fears of genetic discrimination may prevent people from undergoing valuable
genetic testing or participating in genetics research. 164 Thus, whether of not genetic information
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George J. Annas et. al, Drafting the Genetics Privacy Act: Science, Policy, and
Practical Considerations, 23 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 360, 360 (1995).
162

The fact that the public and even medical professionals are poorly educated about
genetics lends some credence to these concerns. Clayton, supra note 35, at 138. Indeed, many
of the anecdotal accounts of genetic discrimination have been attributed to misinterpretation of
genetic information. Beckwith & Alper, supra note 30, at 206.
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See infra TAN 11-18.
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ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 410, para. 513/5(2) (2000) (“Despite existing laws,
regulations, and professional standards which require or promote voluntary and confidential use
of genetic testing information, many members of the public are deterred from seeking genetic
testing because of fear that test results will be disclosed without consent or be used in a
discriminatory manner.”); Yesley, supra note 136, at 663 (noting that “[t]he laws barring genetic
discrimination in health insurance do not respond to a substantial problem but to a perceived
threat of loss of insurance that might hinder genetic researchers’ search for human subjects”);
Beckwith & Alper, supra note 30, at 207 (noting that “people who would benefit from a genetic
test that detects the presence of an altered gene for a disease long before symptoms associated
with that disease appear may choose not to submit to a test for fear of losing their insurance.”);
Testimony May 21, 1998, Francis S. Collins Director National Human Genome Research
Institute Senate Labor and Human Resources Privacy of Individual Genetic Information
(“[N]early one-third of the high risk people Dr. Weber invites into [her research program on
breast cancer and genetics] refuse because they fear discrimination and/or a loss of privacy. So
strong is the fear of misuse of genetic information obtained in research programs that many
physician-researchers leave genetic test results out of the study medical record or warn
participants not to give the information to their private physicians.”). This is a public-health
efficiency argument, which has influenced the protection of other sensitive information. See
infra TAN 329-331.
43

is in fact unique, the public perceives it as uniquely threatening. Genetics legislation therefore
addresses the public health consequences potentially raised by public concerns. 165
The second line of arguments describes why genetic information should be accorded
privacy protections. Perhaps the most common argument, captured in part by the “future diary”
metaphor, is that genetic information, like a diary, is personal information. 166 Some describe
genetic information as highly sensitive and stigmatizing, calling it a “figurative scarlet letter.” 167
In addition, genetic privacy is important because, as some preambles suggest, 168 genetic
information is unique – we each have a different genome sequence. 169 Indeed, because of its
uniqueness, genetic analysis can be used for identification purposes. 170 It can also be used to
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purposes of [former President Clinton’s executive order prohibiting federal agencies from using
genetic information for hiring, promotion, or dismissal decisions] is to calm public fears to spur
development of genetic technologies and to help genetic researchers recruit study subjects”).
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Ronald M. Green & A. Matthew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for
Policy Analysis, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 571, 579 (1998). A related issue, beyond the scope of
this article, concerns the problem of confidentiality of large volumes of genetic information
stored in DNA databanks as increasing numbers of states enact DNA databanking laws. See
Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA
Databanking, 28 J. L. Med. & Ethics 209, for a discussion of the nature and trend of such laws.
A large body of literature has been written regarding possible concerns, including privacy
concerns, in the creation of such databanks. See, e.g., Andrea De Gorgey, Note, The Advent of
DNA Databases: Implications for Information Privacy, 16 AM. J. L. M ED. 381 (1990); Michelle
Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool? 34 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 767 (1999); Eric T. Juengst, I-DNA-Fication, Personal Privacy, and Social Justice, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (1999); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions
Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995); Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic
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probe into the personal lives of historical figures, as was done to prove that Thomas Jefferson
probably fathered children with Sally Heming. 171
We may also have privacy interests in genetic information for a variety of more complex
reasons. First, genetic information can reveal information about, and is therefore important to,
family members. 172 Thus what we or others learn about ourselves implicates knowledge about
our family, making privacy interests more complex. In addition, one may want control over
one’s genetic information both because it is hidden from and potentially unknown to us and
others 173 and because it can identify health risks long before the condition manifests itself or
treatment is available. 174 For example, although we identified the cystic fibrosis and sickle cell
anemia genes long ago, we still have no cure for those diseases. 175
2.

Over-Inclusiveness
Although there are many powerful reasons for carving out special protections for genetic

Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185
(1996); J. Clay Smith, The Precarious Implications of DNA Profiling, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 865
(1994); Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for
21st Century Crime Control, 90 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (2000); Warren Webster, Note,
DNA Database Statutes & Privacy in the Information Age, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 119 (2000).
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Madison J. Gray, A Founding Father and His Family Ties, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 3,
2001, at B1. The longevity of DNA heightens this concern for some. See Green & Thomas,
supra note 170, at 577.
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Green & Thomas, supra note 170, at 580-84. Indeed, genetic information can
sometimes reveal nonpaternity. The family argument can be taken a step further to include the
larger family of shared ethnicity. For example, certain ethnic groups share increased risks for
particular genetic diseases. For example, those of Askenazi Jewish heritage have a higher
incidence of Tay Sachs disease and sickle cell anemia is more prevalent among those of African
descent. Id. at 585.
173

Smith & Burns, supra note 167, at 28

174

See Jacobi, supra note 41, at 321; Green & Thomas, supra note 170, at 573.

175
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information, genetic information is both over- and/or under-inclusive with respect to all of those
concerns. Let us begin with the problem of over-inclusiveness, which is a lesser problem.
Concerns about the lack of control over one’s genes, the high level of predictiveness of genetic
information, and its stigmatizing and hidden features do not apply equally to all genetic
information. Though we cannot control the genes that we inherit, we can sometimes control
factors that influence the degree to which genes affect our future health. For example, if one has
two copies of the gene for phenylketonuria (“PKU”) and phenylalanine is removed from the diet,
PKU will not develop. Similarly if one has the gene for colon cancer, one may reduce the risk of
developing cancer by undergoing regular endoscopies, dietary regimes, or surgery. Furthermore,
although some genetic information – such as a positive genetic test for Huntington’s disease – is
highly predictive of disease, the Huntington’s disease model proves to be the exception, not the
rule. Many genes are only predisposing and do not guarantee that the condition will develop. 176
In fact, most genetic information does not predict future health risk. For example, information
that someone carries a single copy of a recessive gene may increase the chances of having an
affected child, but it does not increase the risk of future disease in the carrier. 177 And of course,
information that a mutation is absent, as it is in most of our genes, does not predict future
disease.
In addition, genetic legislation is over-inclusive to the extent that it is based on the
“uniqueness” argument. Although genetic information can be identifiable, the vast majority of
to do so as we identify more genes. Clayton, supra note 35, at 134.
176

Estimates for a cumulative risk of breast cancer by age 70 with in BRCA1 carriers
have ranged from 35% to 87%. See Robert J. Pokorski & Ulrike Ohlmer, Use of Markov Model
to Estimate Long-Term Insured Lives’ Mortality Risk Associated With BRCA1 and BRCA2
Mutations, 4 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 130, 131 (2001). Estimates for ovarian cancer risks by age
70 in BRCA1 and/or BRCA2 carriers range from 16% to 44%. Initial estimates for cancer risks
associated with these disease genes were higher because studies had focused primarily on high
risk families, who may face other shared genetic or environmental risks. Id.
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As more predictive genetic tests become available and are used, however, genetic
will increasingly be predictive. The point is that not all genetic mutations are necessarily
predictive of future disease. To be predictive of one’s future health risk, they must affect gene
expression in a non-recessive gene, such as BRCA1 or the Huntington’s gene.
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genetic information is not unique. We share more than 99.9% of our genetic information with
others, and even 99 % with chimpanzees. 178 Only a very small fraction of genetic information is
actually unique to us. 179 Similarly, not all genetic information is highly sensitive and
stigmatizing. Blood type is neither sensitive nor stigmatizing. As far as I know, no one has lost
a job opportunity because of blood type, alone. Moreover, a great deal of information is not
hidden from us and others. Whether we have two X chromosomes or an X and Y is readily
apparent, 180 as is eye color. Finally, although treatment is limited for many genetic conditions,
some genetic conditions, such as hemochromatosis and PKU, are preventable.
These problems of over-inclusiveness suggest that it is not genetic information per se that
is necessarily susceptible to misuse. Rather certain kinds of genetic information – particularly
predictive or predisposing genetic information, or information that increases genetic risks in
family members – raise concerns of discrimination. Over-inclusiveness is not a serious
problem, however, and can easily be ameliorated with some definitional fine-tuning. 181 The
primary concern with over-inclusiveness is that it may be unnecessarily costly to restrict uses of
genetic information that do not seem particularly susceptible to discriminatory uses. For
example, genetic information like eye color and sex does not seem likely to lead to insurance or
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DNA.” Weiss, supra note 86, at A10; Wade, Genome’s Riddles, supra note 85, at F1.
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This is true in virtually all cases. A rare condition, such as testicular feminization
syndrome, proves the exception because it results in female phenotypes in those with an XY
karyotype. Joe L. Simpson, Disorders of Gonads and Internal Reproductive Ducts, in 2
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS at 1593, 1601 (Alan E.H. Emery & David L.
Rimoin eds., 2d ed. 1990).
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employment discrimination and we might therefore find penalties for unauthorized disclosure of
such information unnecessary and problematic.
One solution, which some state legislators have employed is to limit protections to the
categories of genetic information that seem particularly susceptible to misuse, such as
asymptomatic, predictive, or predisposing genetic information or carrier status. 182 These
solutions will not be perfect and will result in some lesser degree of over-inclusiveness with
respect to some concerns – not all asymptomatic information is predictive, for example, and not
all predisposing information is equally predictive or stigmatizing. But the cost of the overinclusiveness may be a price well worth paying in order to protect the most stigmatizing genetic
information.
3.

Under-Inclusiveness
The much more problematic aspect of the imprecise fit of genetics legislation to its

underlying concerns is its under-inclusiveness. This problem infects virtually every justification
in favor of protecting genetic information, raising serious questions about the validity of limiting
these protections to just genetic information, particularly in light of the definitional difficulties
addressed in Section A. For example, consider the argument that genes are not in our control.
Genetics, it turns out, proves an inadequate proxy for what is not in our control. 183 Although we
cannot control the genes we inherit, we cannot control a great many other risk factors, such as in
utero exposures, environmental conditions, or drunk drivers, which may have profound effects
on our future health. 184 Moreover, many risk factors, which seem very much in one’s control,
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may be less so than we imagine. Addictive behavior is influenced by genetic elements, as well
as many social elements outside of our control, such as family, socio-economic status, and
culture. 185 Controlling one’s weight, for example, is not solely a matter of willpower. 186 Even
addiction to smoking has genetic elements. 187 Thus, genetics does not function satisfactorily as
an exclusive category for risks outside our control.
Genetic information is also an under-inclusive category with respect to other concerns
that inspire genetic nondiscrimination laws. For example, genetic information is not alone in its
predictive capacity. Before the advent of protease inhibitors, HIV infection virtually ensured the
future development of AIDS. Similarly, significant asbestos exposure leads to a high risk of
lung cancer. Worries that insurers or employers will discriminate based on genetic information
apply equally to other medical information. Indeed, we know with certainty that insurers use
medical information to discriminate (i.e., in making risk-based distinctions). 188 In addition,
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or Lose, N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 17, 2000, at D1, D8. Scientists have identified regions of the brain
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employers use medical information in the workplace to test fitness for duty and susceptibility to
workplace hazards. 189 And although we may worry about misinterpretations of genetic
information, sadly, evidence shows that insurers and employers are careless and imprecise in
their use of other actuarial data and risk information. 190 While that may only inspire greater fear
with regard to genetic information, it emphasizes problems with the underwriting system and
employer use of medical information generally; not specifically with respect to genetics. Finally,
concerns that fears of discrimination will prevent individuals from participating in medical
research or diagnosis for such conditions as mental illness or cancer have been used to justify the
protection of other medical information. 191
The privacy concerns that spark particular attention with respect to genetics also extend
well beyond genetics. Genetic information is not uniquely personal or revealing. Our life
histories are as personal and revealing as our genetic code. One’s culture, family, friends,
education, career, beliefs, and dreams all reveal as much if not more about who we are and will
become than our genes. Nor is genetic information uniquely unique. Other information is
personally identifying. Old fashioned fingerprints, dental analysis, iris scans, voice prints,
handwritten signature measurements, and “esoteric biometrics” 192 can identify individuals, 193 as

Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267 JAMA 2503, 2504 (1992) (describing the kind of risk
information that insurers use); Gaulding, supra note 55, at 1667 (same).
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Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How to
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TECHNOLOGIES 39-41 (1989)
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can other less high-tech information, such as social security number, address, phone number, and
credit card number. Even more general information, such as neighborhood, age, occupation,
marital status, and number and ages of children, can be identifying in the aggregate. 194 In
addition, genetics is not the only mechanism to probe into past lives. Other techniques have
been used to explore the personal histories of the deceased. Bone analysis was used to determine
whether Meriwether Lewis had syphilis and whether he was murdered or committed suicide. 195
Infrared light and computer imaging software uncovered the original image of letters thought to
hold secrets of illicit love affairs or sexual relationships, such as those between Emily Dickinson
and Susan Austin (the wife of Dickinson’s brother) and Matthew Arnold and his older sister,
Jane. 196 Surely, those techniques uncover facts no less private or illuminating than those
revealed through genetic analysis. 197
Similarly, non-genetic information may be highly sensitive or stigmatizing, perhaps even
more so than most genetic information. Information regarding sexually transmitted diseases,
mental illness, reproductive history, addiction, marital status, or a history of abuse might
influence how potential partners, insurers, employers, and society view and treat us. Indeed,
because people view genes as outside our control, genetic information might be less stigmatizing
than other information associated with behavior – such as a history of sexually transmitted
diseases – and therefore less susceptible to moral judgment.
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Of course this suggests that privacy protections should be even broader than just
medical information since sensitive information extends beyond the medical arena. Whether
protecting the privacy of just medical information is an example of medical exceptionalism is a
worthwhile issue, which goes beyond the scope of this article.
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Nor is genetic information unique in its capacity to be hidden from or potentially
unknown to us and others. One may be unaware of numerous hidden risks such as viral
infections, prenatal exposures, abnormal biochemical levels, and even environmental risks.
Cancers may grow within our bodies long before we exhibit symptoms. Although the related
problem of the therapeutic gap is serious in genetics, diagnostics are also more advanced than
available treatments outside of genetics. 198 We can diagnose many cancers that we cannot treat,
and we still have no cure for AIDS, the leading cause of death among 25-44 year olds. 199
Finally, genetic information is not the only information that is relevant to family
members. Whether someone in the family has tuberculosis, scarlet fever, or a sexually
transmitted disease may tell us something about certain family members’ risks. So relevant is
this information to family members that courts have imposed duties on physicians to warn
families of the infectious nature of the patient’s disease. 200 Recently, two courts have held that
physicians also have a duty to their patient’s family to warn of genetic risks. 201 Indeed, one court
saw “no essential difference between [a] genetic threat . . . and the menace of infection contagion
or a threat of physical harm,”202 rejecting the defendant’s implicit genetics exceptionalism
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member to warn of genetic risks is fulfilled by taking “reasonable steps to . . . assure that the
information reaches those likely to be affected or is made available for their benefit”). See also
Sonia Suter, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?, 91 M ICH. L. REV. 1854 (1993) for an overview
of whether health care professionals should have a duty or privilege to warn relatives about
genetic risks.
202

Safer, 667 A.2d at 1192.

52

argument.
For all of these reasons, genetic information is a seriously under-inclusive category with
respect to virtually all of the concerns motivating genetics legislation. Although the overinclusiveness proves a small problem, subject to some remedy, under-inclusiveness is a more
comprehensive problem, with more far reaching ramifications. In particular, as Section C shows,
it results in unintended inequities in insurance underwriting, employment, and with respect to
privacy interests both among individuals and among classes of individuals.
C.

Inequities
Consider first the prohibitions of health-insurers’ use of genetic information for

underwriting or rate-making. Imagine that two women face an increased risk for breast cancer.
The first woman, Jeannie, has a positive test for BRCA1, a gene associated with an increased
risk of breast and other cancers. This test result puts her at anywhere from a 35% to 87%
lifetime risk of breast cancer. 203 The second woman, Eve, faces a significant risk of cancer, not
based on a genetic test or family history, 204 but on other factors or tests that suggest she has a
high predisposition. 205 For example, she may have faced significant exposure to asbestos206 or
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cavity and surround the internal organs”), and asbestosis. Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure
Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proof and The Regulatory Experience, 18
COLUM. J. ENVT’ L. L. 181, 291-92, 294 (1993). Exposure to asbestos for ten years has been
linked to an increased risk of lung cancer of 10%. Id. at 293. The relative risk for lung cancer
after significant exposure of asbestos is five, meaning that eighty percent of lung cancers among
those exposed to asbestos were caused by asbestos. Id. at 299-300. Asbestos also poses an
“extremely high” relative risk of developing mesothelioma. Id. at 294. Smoking can increase
one’s risk of cancer from asbestos exposure, though it does not appear to increase the risk of
mesthelioma. Id. at 300. Finally, asbestosis, “a pulmonary insufficiency caused by a destruction
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she may have a precancerous condition that resulted from environmental exposures, which puts
her at risk of cancer. Both women face a notable cancer risk, but one risk is perceived as genetic
and the other as non-genetic. In fact, whether or not either woman ultimately develops cancer
will depend on the interaction of her particular genes and environment. Various environmental
factors (which we do not fully understand yet) will influence whether Jeannie develops breast
cancer, and Eve’s genotype will influence whether she develops cancer, demonstrating again
how problematic it is to describe one risk as genetic and the other as environmental.
Assume that Eve and Jeannie live in a state with genetics legislation that prohibits
insurance and employment discrimination and that protects the privacy of genetic information.
Assume further that they are seeking coverage through individual insurance plans. 207 Although
their risks depend on both genetic and environmental factors, 208 Eve and Jeannie will be treated
very differently by genetics legislation. Legislation prohibiting insurance discrimination based
on genetic information would cover Jeannie’s risk, 209 even under the narrowest definition of

of air sacs in healthy lung tissue,” which can dramatically reduce life expectancy and impair lung
capacity, In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 129 B.R. 710, 740
(E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y., Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), has been found in 90% of people who have been
exposed to asbestos for 40 years, Boston, supra, at 292. “Some evidence suggests that persons
with asbestosis may have an increased risk of contracting lung cancer and other malignancies.”
In re Joint, at 740. Epidemiological studies have also suggested excess risks of cancer of the
kidney, larynx, pharynx and mouth among asbestos insulation workers. Id. at 740. It is not only
those exposed occupationally to asbestos that face these increased risks. Data suggest that
people exposed to asbestos casually through household contact with asbestos works face
increased risks of lung cancer, colon cancer and mesothelioma. Id. at 742.
207

This assumption is necessary because the genetics insurance laws “protect
significantly fewer than 10 percent of Americans” for a few reasons. Reilly, supra note 8, at
123. First, under ERISA preemption, state insurance legislation does not apply to self-funded
employer health plans, under which one third of the non-elderly insured are covered. Id.
Second, many of the statutes apply to individuals in the market for individually underwritten
health insurance, a category of individuals that “is steadily declining, largely because of the high
cost of purchasing such policies.” Id. at 122.
208

Of course some risk is background risk, which are those risks apart from specific
environmental or genetic hazards or risks we have not yet attributed to a particular cause.
209

In many states, this wo uld only be true if she were asymptomatic. Since much of
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genetic information; 210 but it would not cover Eve’s. Eve might be denied insurance, 211 but more
likely, she would pay higher premiums to reflect her increased risk. But Jeannie’s premiums
would not be raised to reflect her risk because, like others with genetic risks, everyone in the
insurance pool would subsidize the genetic risks. 212 In other words, Eve would “cover” her
known increased risk, even as she helps subsidize Jeannie’s. This result is unjust because some
known risks are subsidized and others aren’t. Moreover, there is no coherent reason for that
difference, except that one risk is “genetic” and the other is not. 213
Similar inequities play out in the employment context when employers are prohibited
from making employment decisions on the basis of genetic information. 214 Jeannie’s job and
the genetics legislation only addresses discriminatory use of presymptomatic or asymptomatic
genetic information, symptomatic individuals would not be protected. That fact, alone raises
serious inequities since it is troubling to imagine that one who is currently sick might be denied
health insurance or required to pay extremely high rates at the very moment she most needs
health care and support.
210

If Jeannie’s mother had the BRCA1 gene, this would also constitute genetic
information under the broader definitions. Based on that family history alone, without knowing
whether Jeannie had the BRCA1 gene, her risk of cancer would be in the range of 18-44%.
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“A detailed study prepared for Senator Kassebaum by the General Accounting
Office found that 18 percent of people seeking new individual polices were flatly turned down
because of their health status.” Robert Kuttner, The Kassenbaum-Kennedy Bill – The Limits of
Incrementalism, 337 NEJM 64, 64 (1997).
212

Of course, everyone already subsidizes unidentified genetic and non-genetic risks,
because insurers have no way of figuring out who should pay higher rates. The problem is that
the identified risks are treated differently depending on whether they are genetic or non-genetic.
213

As we’ve seen supra in Part.II.B.3, the justifications for distinguishing genetic
from non-genetic information are not persuasive. One might imagine an opposite and equally
troubling inequity. A person who diets to stay thin or avoids smoking may obtain lower
insurance rates, whereas a person who tests negative for a genetic susceptibility would not since
such genetic information would be off-limits from consideration. I thank Max Mehlman for this
particular example.
214

Employers might want medical information for decisions about a employee’s
fitness for the job, Hoffman, supra note 189, at _____, or susceptibility to workplace hazards, or
perhaps because of concerns about insurance costs, Miller, supra note 55, at 261.
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promotions would be protected, but Eve’s might be at risk, particularly if the employer has
access to all other health information. 215 Whether the ADA would protect both woman from
employment decisions based on concerns about future productivity and health insurance costs is
an open question. 216 Such a claim would require them to establish that any adverse employment
decision was based on this risk information, a difficult task indeed. 217 The best protection
against employment discrimination is therefore to limit employer access to risk information.
Some forms of genetics legislation prohibit employers from obtaining genetic information, 218

215

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, employers may requires employees to
undergo a medical examination once a conditional offer has been made. 41 U.S.C.A. §
12112(d)(3). The employer must not, however, limit such examination to those with disabilities;
it must be required of all entering employees. Id. at § 12112(d)(3)(A). There appears to be no
requirement that these pre-employment examinations are job-related. Rothstein, supra note 55,
at 55-56.
216

Some courts and the EEOC reason that when employers have concerns about an
employee’s future productivity and insurance costs, the employee is protected under the
“regarded as” prong of the ADA. Miller, supra note 55, at 240. But see Mark S. Dichter & Sara
E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us Disabled Individuals Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 613, 631 (1997). Moreover, even if the ADA
did cover such individuals, the fact that employers can still obtain broad access to medical
information through the pre-employment medical examination raises real concerns because “it
facilitates surreptitious testing and discriminatory reliance upon non-job-related criteria in
decisionmaking,” Rothstein, supra note 55, at 58, which can be difficult, if not impossible, to
prove.
217

Moreover, even if one could prove that adverse employment decisions were based
on this risk information, the recent Supreme Court trilogy of ADA cases suggests that recovery
might nevertheless be difficult. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999);
Alberstons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999). In Sutton, applicants for airline pilot positions were not regarded as
disabled by their employer, even though they were denied employment based on their myopia.
Instead, the Court reasoned that their poor vision only precluded them from performing the
single job of airline pilot and therefore did not substantially limit the major life activity of work.
See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. One could imagine this argument playing out in many different
contexts, where employers insist that denying employment opportunities based on a medical
condition or genetic trait was not a substantial limitation of a major life activity. See Miller,
supra note 55, at 245-46.
218

See supra TAN 102-106.
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which would only protect Jeannie, but not Eve. 219 Once again no coherent reason justifies this
disparity. Instead, the disparity is the result of conceptually flawed distinctions and the underinclusiveness of the category of “genetic information.”
Finally, genetics privacy legislation may also lead to inequities, at least until April 14th ,
2003, the rule compliance date for the HIPAA privacy regulations. 220 To the extent that privacy
laws are intended to prevent discrimination by employers, insurers or others, the inequities in this
context present the problems described above. But genetics privacy legislation also results in
disparities with respect to self-determination, autonomy, and dignity interests. Both Jeannie and
Eve have an interest in deciding for themselves whether to disclose their increased risk of cancer
to others. In a state with only genetic privacy legislation, Jeannie would have greater, though not
full, control over such disclosure than Eve. 221 The fact that Jeannie’s risk is “genetic” does not

219

Indeed, it is a common practice among employers not to hire people with asbestos
exposure because they want employees with “virgin lungs,” to reduce the risk of being held
accountable for future lung disease that may develop. (Personal communication with Mark
Rothstein).
220

See http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ (visited 6/9/01). When the HIPPA privacy
regulations go into effect “all medical records and other individually identifiable health
information use or disclosed by a covered entity in any form, whether electronically, on paper, or
orally will be covered by the final rule.
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/01fsprivacy.html (visited 6/9/01). To the extent that
the federal privacy rules provide less privacy coverage than some genetics statutes, some
inequities may remain in those states, since the more stringent genetics privacy protections
(which would not be preempted by the federal rules, which set only a “floor”of privacy
protections ), would cover only genetic information. As a result, the privacy of genetic
information would be protected more aggressively than other medical information. However, to
the extent that the federal rules provide equal to or greater privacy protections than other genetics
privacy statutes, the privacy inequities would no longer exist in those states since the HIPAA
rules apply to all medical, not just genetic, information. See id.
221

In the employment context, their control might be limited if an employer were to
require a pre-employment examination upon a conditional offer of employment, as it would be
allowed to do under the ADA, see supra, note 215. More specifically, they would not have
control over disclosure of medical information obtained from such an examination. Instead, they
would face a difficult Hobson’s choice of refusing the job or undergoing the medical
examination. If insurers are prohibited from requesting genetic information for coverage
decisions, then Eve would have less control than Jeannie, since Eve would face the same
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necessarily increase her interest in preventing disclosure. Indeed, Eve may feel more sensitive
about her increased cancer risk, given that she has no protection against discrimination based on
this information. Again, no principled reason exists for this disparity. Jeannie’s and Eve’s
interest in controlling disclosure of personal health information is equally powerful and therefore
deserving of equal forms of protection.
The most disturbing aspect of the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation, however, is
not the disparities that arise between similarly situated individuals like Jeannie and Eve. More
troubling, and less immediately obvious, is that the unintended inequities of genetics legislation
exacerbate social inequities. Although genetic risks transcend socio-economic class, non-genetic
risks frequently do not. 222 Many non-genetic risks have sociological components related to
poverty and environmental hazards, some of which are not in one’s control. For example,
numerous studies demonstrate that people of color and low income communities face
disproportionate environmental impacts in the United States. 223 One source of such
environmental risk is “hazardous waste sites, incinerators, chemical factories and sewage
treatment plants,” which are placed disproportionately in these lower-income communities. 224

Hobson’s choice as in the employment context.
222

Of course this claim is more or less true depending on the disease or health risk in

question.
223

See Benjamin A. Goldman, Not Just Prosperity: Achieving Sustainability with
Environmental Justice, NAT’L WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COUNCIL 9 (1993).
224

Clarice E. Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endangered Communities,
21 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 771, 771-772 (1994); Peter Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of
Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REV. 272, 273 (1992); UNITED CHURCH OF
CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL J USTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 1314 (1987). But see Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to Nuisance or Going to Barrios? A
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 8, 34 (1997)
(noting that some studies based on 1990 census data have found no significant difference in the
percentage of African Americans or Hispanics in areas with or without hazardous sites, but
pointing out that such studies failed to control for differences in density). A longitudinal study of
the siting of undesirable land uses, such as waste facilities, between 1970 and 1990, found that
“Hispanics, rather than African Americans, . . . are most at risk from” decisions about where to
place treatment storage and disposal facilities sites. Id. at 34. One method of statistical
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Minorities and the poor also face high levels of lead exposure. 225 Continuous exposure to such
environmental hazards poses increased risks of “cancer, asthma, chronic bronchitis, emphysema
and other respiratory diseases, reproductive and birth defects, immunological problems, and
neurological defects.” 226 In addition, low socio-economic status is disproportionately associated
with “virtually all of the chronic disease that are the leading causes of mortality”; infectious
diseases, such as HIV or tuberculosis; traumatic injuries and death; and developmental delay and
other disabilities. 227
As a result, the poor, which includes many minorities, are more likely to face non-genetic
risks than the middle or upper classes. Many of these risks can be measured through high
cholesterol, high blood pressure, high blood levels of lead or other toxins, etc. If insurers, for
example, can make actuarial decisions on the basis of evidence of non-genetic risks, but not
genetic risks, we allow discrimination that will disproportionately disadvantage these vulnerable
populations. Or to put it differently, we ask the least advantaged to bear their own non-genetic
risks alone, even as we ask everyone, including them, to subsidize genetic risks. 228 Given that
analysis, however, revealed that African Americans are over-represented in neighborhoods
housing waste facilities, while other statistical analyses reached different conclusions. Id. In
addition, the study showed that the working or lower middle classes, as opposed to the very poor,
host a disproportionate share of these facilities. Id. This study provides some nuance to the
issue of environmental justice, though it should be noted that it focuses primarily on treatment
storage and disposal facilities, rather than all the possible environmental hazards that one might
expect to be associated with poverty, and by inference, minority groups, given the higher
incidence of poverty among minorities.
225

“African-American children from poor families are subjected to dangerous levels
of lead at a rate nine times that of children from more affluent families . . . . Fifty -five percent
of [such children] have an increased blood level,” subjecting them to mental disability and
learning impairment. Gaylord & Twitty, supra note 224, at 776-77. Migrant farm-workers also
face a heightened risk of exposure to environmental hazards such as pesticides and other toxic
substances, both through working conditions and “deplorable housing conditions.” Id. at 777.
226

Id. at 771-772.
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Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the
Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. LOUIS L. J. 7, 31 (1994).
228

This presumes that these individuals are part of a pool of individually
underwritten insurance. Of course, to the extent that insurance is prohibitively expensive
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many environmental hazards as well as other health risks are linked to poverty and low socioeconomic status, 229 there is reason to be concerned about the social impact of a policy that only
protects genetic risks, but does not protect the risks that most profoundly affect the poor and
minorities.
Finally, although genetic risk factors transcend socio-economic status, the individuals
currently most concerned about genetic discrimination may not represent the full socio-economic
spectrum. Genetic discrimination is primarily on the minds of those interested in genetic testing
for research or clinical purposes, who tend to be people whose basic health care needs have been
met. 230 As a result, genetics discrimination is principally a concern of the middle to upper
classes, who have financial resources for testing, and jobs and insurance they fear losing. This
group of well-educated, well-off individuals has lobbied heavily for genetics legislation. In
contrast, the groups most vulnerable to health risks related to poverty and environmental hazards
do not have the same political voice or cohesiveness. There is a danger that the strong political
voice of the first group outshadows the interests of equally or more vulnerable, but less
politically powerful groups. In short, genetics-specific legislation becomes another “middle

because of their high risks, they may simply opt out of insurance coverage altogether, in which
case they would not subsidize anyone else’s risk. But nor would they have insurance coverage.
The sort of individuals I imagine are those who do not have insurance through employers
(perhaps they are only part-time workers), but who make too much money to be eligible for
Medicaid. Even if they obtain insurance through their employers, however, they may face
discrimination based on these health risks.
229

“For virtually all of the chronic disease that are the leading causes of mortality,
low income is a special risk factor. . . . The poor also suffer disproportionately from infectious
disease such as HIV and respiratory diseases such as tuberculosis. Similar vulnerability is found
among the poor for traumatic injuries and death. Finally, the rate of developmental and other
disabilities, especially among children, is associated with poverty.” Gostin, supra note 227, at
31.
230

Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Genetic Privacy Laws and Patients’ Fear of
Discrimination by Health Insurers: The View from Genetic Counselors, 28 J. L. MED & ETHICS
245, 251(2000) (“Medicaid patients are understandably much less concerned about [genetic
discrimination] because their focus is on more immediately pressing needs.”); Lemmens, supra
note 154, at 364-65 (noting the power of lobbying among groups who have insurance to lose).
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class entitlement.” 231
D.

The Defense of Incrementalism
While these inequities are troubling, and while the motivations for genetic information

apply equally to other medical information, a plausible defense for the under-inclusiveness of
genetics legislation is the strategy of incrementalism. This is a common constitutional and
pragmatic defense when legislation is under-inclusive with respect to its larger purposes. In a
perfect world, Eve and Jeannie would be treated similarly, but under this view, we can only solve
one problem at a time. The “political realists” would argue that incremental reform is far more
realistic than full-scale reform. By urging reform with respect to genetics, one can move toward
the ultimate goal of protecting all medical information, without directly placing on the table the
fact that similar concerns apply to other medical information. Extending genetics protections to
other medical information too soon, for example, might be at best, very difficult, and at worst,
politically unwise. 232 The better approach, the pragmatist would argue, is to open the door to
reform with genetics legislation, for which there is widespread political and public support.
Once the door is ajar, we can incrementally open it wider over time. For these pragmatists,
incrementalism is the only politically viable approach, particularly with politically charged
subjects. One need only recall the debacle of the former Clinton administration’s efforts to
achieve health care reform to envision the mine-fields of attempts at broad scale reform. 233 If we
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In reality, it is more of a middle, to upper-middle, class entitlement.
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For example, eliminating underwriting based on all medical information would
essentially create community rating in health insurance, which although employed by most
Western nations, faces some political obstacles in this country.
233

The Clinton administration was appropriately faulted for the process by which it
attempted reform. See M. Susan Ridgely & Howard Goldman, Putting the “Failure” of National
Health Care Reform in Perspective, 40 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 407, 418-19 (1996); Michele L.
Procino, Note, The Death of Health Care Reform in 1994, 1 WIDNER L. S YMPOSIUM J., 547 57879 (1996). Nevertheless, Americans’ discomfort with big government, see Jacobi, supra, at 314,
339, 370, the strengths of interests groups, see Ridgely & Goldman, supra, at 418, and
America’s fragmented political structure, see Kuttner, supra note 211, at 64, undoubtedly
played a large role in its downfall, despite considerable public support for the notion of health
care reform. See Theodore R. Marmor, The National Agenda for Health Care Reform, 60
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view genetics legislation as one step toward larger reform, 234 these inequities seem less
problematic.
Such a strategy might potentially work in one of two ways. One theory is that the
protections created by genetics legislation will eventually apply to all medical information
because genetic analysis will be so integral to every aspect of future medical records. 235 For
example, DNA chips, which will allow for the testing of multiple genetic mutations could create
a medical record replete with genetic information, under even the most narrow definitions. 236
Under this theory, genetic tests could be performed easily and efficiently for multiple purposes:
for preventive care (to determine the genetic risks a person faces so that they can reduce these
risks through diet, medicine, exercise, and other measures); to personalize the prescription of
medical drugs based on one’s genotype (i.e., pharmacogenetics); for reproductive decision
making; etc. If everyone’s medical information is inextricably connected with the results of
genetic tests, it will be literally impossible, under this theory, to separate out genetic and medical
information. Moreover, if one takes the view, as some such incrementalists might, that genetic
influences are virtually inseparable from and integral to all phenotypic phenomena, including
physical appearance, non-genetic test results, and life style, than any piece of information on the
medical record is essentially genetic information. 237 Under either view, genetics legislation is

BROOKLYN L. REV. 83, 84-85 (1994); Ridgely & Goldman, supra, at 418, 420-21. Nor was this
the first failed health care reform effort. “On about a twenty year cycle during this century, we
have considered and rejected joining our industrialized neighbors in treating health care as a
public good through national statutory health insurance.” Jacobi, supra note 41, at 314. See
Procino, supra, at 547-48, 575-76, for a summary of prior failed attempts at health care reform.
234

Rarely is such a defense explicitly offered for genetics legislation. For one of the
few statements related to this argument, see Beckwith & Alper, supra note 30, at 208-09. Their
argument is slightly different, however. Rather than defending genetics legislation as an
incremental first step, they argue, as I do, that genetics legislation is flawed and needs to be
rewritten to protect other medical information.
235

I thank Bob Cook-Deegan for his observations on this point.

236

Of course the broader the definition, the more information that could be included.
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the “Trojan Horse” of health care reform, because in protecting the privacy of genetic
information or prohibiting genetics discrimination, legislators will have unwittingly protected all
medical information. 238
The likelihood of this strategy’s succeess is uncertain. Not everyone believes that
genetics will revolutionize medicine so profoundly. The complexity in understanding the role of
single and multiple genes and environmental factors with respect to the most common diseases,
may limit the ways in which genetics can be used to identify or prevent diseases. 239 If genetics’
role in prevention and treatment is limited, genetics legislation may not achieve the goal of
broad-scale protection of medical information. 240 Moreover, legislators may believe they have
solved the issues of nondiscrimination and privacy and fail to broaden reform beyond genetics
issues.
Another more typical incrementalist strategy would begin by taking the first incremental
step – genetics legislation – as if based on principled distinctions between genetic and nongenetic information. 241 This draws on public support. Once genetics legislation is well
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This view might be considered a genetics determinism perspective. It need not be
a fully deterministic perspective, however, since the claim that genes play a role in all phenotype
does not necessarily mean that they play the only role. In other words, one might take such a
view, even while accounting for the influence of environment and complex gene-gene
interactions. Of course, one might also take such a view based on a pure (and naive) genetics
deterministic perspective.
238

Max Mehlman deserves credit for this apt metaphor.
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See Neil A. Holtzman & Theresa M. Marteau, Will Genetics Revolutionize
Medicine?, 353 NEJM 141 (2000).
240

Of course, as we will see infra in Part III.C, ideally, the HIPAA privacy
regulations will achieve this goal of broad scale protection of the privacy of medical information
once covered entities begin to comply with the regulations. Similarly, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, moves in the right direction with respect to insurance
nondiscrimination, by prohibiting group plans from making underwriting decisions on the basis
of medical, not just genetic, information. See infra TAN 348-351.
241

The extent to which this motivates genetics legislation today is uncertain. This
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established, one can begin to challenge these distinctions. The goal would then be to convince
legislators that the initially apparent principled distinctions are in fact not principled. Therefore,
for equity reasons, the protections for genetic information should extend to other medical
information. Indeed, the focus of this article is to urge policy makers to move in precisely that
direction by pointing out that the concerns motivating genetics legislation extend well beyond
genetic information.
There is much to be said for incrementalism. It has become the strategy of choice in
other policy areas, 242 including health care reform. Although “there seems to be an emerging
consensus that universal coverage should be the goal,” 243 the political fallout of the failed
attempts at national health care reform in 1993-94 has been “pushing politicians to seek smaller,
incremental solutions.” 244 Rather than attempting full-scale health reform in one fell swoop, the
strategy has been “smaller, incremental solutions.” 245 For example, in the aftermath of the
failure of the Clinton administration’s efforts to achieve health care reform, Congress enacted the
strategy requires disguising the strategy. That the “Real Politik” argument does not appear in
scholarly articles or testimony before legislators does not mean that it is not motivating this
legislation, at least in part. It may not be the primary motivation for many proponents of
genetics legislation who still adhere to notions of genetics exceptionalism. However, my
suspicion is that this is coalescing into a conscious strategy on the part of some individuals, and
perhaps even interest groups. I have heard allusions to these arguments in backroom discussions
of genetics legislation. Most frequently, however, this justification is offered as speculation by
those opposed to genetics-specific legislation as a plausible argument one might make in favor of
such legislation.
242

See James L. True, Avalanches and Incrementalism: Making Policy and Budgets
in the United States, 30 AM. REV. PUB. ADM ’N 3, 3 (2000) (noting that incrementalism is an
important aspect of government decision making, though emphasizing that it is balanced by a
period of “avalanche[s] of change”).
243

Julie Rovner, Embracing Incrementalism, BUS. & HEALTH, Mar. 2000, at 12 .
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Robin Toner, Gore and Bush Health Proposals Fall Short of Counterparts’ Plans
8 Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 15, 2000, at A22.
245

Id. See Jeffrey Plaut, Age of Incrementalism, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Feb.
1998, at 63 (noting that “[i]ncrementalism is back . . . with a vengeance” as voters become
distrustful of “bold pronouncements from either side of the aisle.”)
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in 1996, which helps those with insurance
maintain coverage. And in 1997, Congress enacted the Children’s Health Insurance Program
(“CHIP”), which covers children from low-income families with incomes too high for
Medicaid. 246 Similarly, both parties advocate expansion of Medicare coverage to include
prescription drugs. 247 In sum, “the step-by-step approach to expanding health coverage has
many defenders, who note that it has the great advantage of being politically realistic.” In
addition, incrementalism offers the possibility of creating a laboratory of approaches with respect
to new issues, so that policy makers can “learn by doing.” 248
The success of incrementalism depends on numerous factors: political concerns,
leadership, state of the economy, public attitudes and attention toward the issue. As some have
observed, incrementalism and large-scale reform are cyclical. 249 In the area of health care, we
have seen a combination of both. 250 Given the strong institutional forces that inspire the genetics
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As of March 2000, two million children were enrolled in the program. Rovner,
supra note 243, at 12.
247

They differ as to precisely how to achieve this goal. Medicare has become a hot
political issue because “‘not only do seniors vote more, but their ability to organize, to hold
forums, has garnered their cause a great deal more attention than the uninsured.’” Id. In
addition, prescription drug coverage is both easier and cheaper to accomplish than other kinds of
reform. Id.
248

I credit Peter Swire with this observation.

249

True, supra note 242, at 3 (asserting that policy making alternates between
incremental change and “virtual avalanche[s] of change.”).
250

The last 15 years have been characterized by incremental reform with respect of
health care coverage. John V. Jacobi, Medicaid Expansion, Crowd-Out and the Limits of
Incremental Reform, 45 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 79, 79 (2001). However, in 1965, with the Lyndon
Johnson’s landslide presidential victory, a strongly Democratic Congress enacted Medicare and
Medicaid, which entailed a major restructuring of financing of health insurance for large
segments of society – the aged and the poor. See RAND E ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE S YSTEM 369, 410-11 (1997); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN M EDICINE 368-370(1982). Though neither constituted fullscale health care reform (indeed not all of those under the poverty line were protected by
Medicaid), see ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra, at 413, the reform was far more than incremental, see
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exceptionalism perspective, however, I am skeptical as to whether incrementalism can succeed
via genetics legislation given prevailing views of genetics. I fear that rather than being the first
step toward broader reform with respect to insurance discrimination, employment discrimination,
or privacy protections, genetics legislation might be the last step.
Much of the impetus and political support for such legislation derives from and builds on
deeply entrenched public sentiments that genetic information is uniquely susceptible to misuse.
Even if not all proponents of genetics legislation intentionally recruit genetics exceptionalism
arguments, the nature of discourse and legislation is inherently genetics-centric, which
institutionalizes the genetics exceptionalism perspective and stigmatizes genetic information by
suggesting it requires special protections. As long as the genetics legislation is largely
understood as grounded in genetics exceptionalism, legislatures will think they have addressed
the real problems and they won’t want to go further. Similarly, the public, media, and even
many scientists will likely feel satisfied that genetics legislation has resolved the important
issues. Wrongs have been righted, justice has been promoted and everyone can rest soundly. 251
As a consequence, once genetics legislation is in place, public support is likely to be anemic with
respect to further reform, and politicians may be reluctant to invest the political capital in
extending these protections beyond genetics. More importantly, they may find it difficult to
conceive of those issues as equally important, especially while genetics exceptionalism is the
prevailing mindset.
This is a general problem with incrementalism, which requires “creative and specific
demonstrations of why each claim to social resources is legitimate.” 252 Advocates must
demonstrate a near crisis for their group as well as the group’s moral claim to such assistance.

True, supra note 242, at 6 (noting that from its inception, Medicare budgeting has featured large,
as opposed to incremental increases).
251

Whether the partial fix of genetics legislation changes much in reality, it has
great symbolic meaning. See Hall, supra note 165, at F7; Reilly, supra note 8, at 124-26.
252

Marmor, supra note 233, at 99.
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The discussion stays narrow and reform is limited to “tinkering at the edges of current policy,” 253
rather than confronting larger principles. “Appeals for special help to the disadvantaged chart
the details of some of our victims, but not the shape of politically viable and institutionally
secure remedies.” 254 As each incremental step is enacted, society is lulled into a false sense of
having solved the pressing crisis.
We are left with the question whether incrementalism via genetics legislation will
succeed by addressing the various concerns of privacy and discrimination in employment and
insurance step by step, or whether it will remain unfulfilled, leaving us with a false sense of
having achieved meaningful reform and, worse, serious inequities among groups. In other
words, does incrementalism have enough momentum to finish its work or must we let things get
so bad that reform is inevitable? 255 In the end, it is impossible to predict whether genetics
legislation will promote larger reform via incrementalism. In my view, its chance of success is
limited because it fails to address the larger underlying concerns and it offers a false sense of
having addressed social issues. Certainly we should be pessimistic about incrementalism’s
potential here unless and until we change the nature of the debate and eliminate the notion of
genetics exceptionalism.
Part III. Genetics Exceptionalism and the Threat to Equal Protection Values
Given these reasons to be skeptical about the success of incrementalism in genetics,
where are we left? The under-inclusiveness and resulting inequities are troubling, but without
more, they offer insufficient reasons to condemn genetics legislation. While we might prefer all
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Id. at 100.
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Id. at 101. Moreover, these efforts at expanding assistance to disadvantaged
groups can backfire, demonstrating that “programs concentrated on the disadvantaged become
disadvantaged programs.” Id. at 99-101 (describing the repeal of the “so-called catastrophic
Medicare Act in the 1990s” by arousing the elderly’s fear of ill treatment).
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Iris Geva-May & Allan Maslove, What Prompts Health Care Policy Changes?
On Political Power Contests and Reform of Health Care Systems (The Case of Canada and
Israel), 25 J. HEALTH POL, POL’ Y & L. 717, 727 (2000) (noting that some reform occurs in
response to crisis, others through “slowly emerging, incremental policy shifts.”).
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statutes to be conceptually sound and precise so as to avoid such problems, they often suffer
from these flaws. To criticize genetics legislation on these grounds alone, 256 would expose a
great deal of other legislative initiatives to similar criticisms. 257 Because all statutes create
classifications, they inevitably exclude some arguably deserving individuals from legal
protections. Some level of inequity is frequently a fair price for the societal advantages of
laws. 258
Indeed, although the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that the government will treat
similar individuals similarly, the vast majority of equal protection claims are “dismissed out of
hand.” 259 In most cases, the courts are highly deferential to a legislature’s chosen classification.
Only if the classification is deemed irrational – if there is no objective difference between the
advantaged and disadvantaged or if the difference is not one to which the government can
legitimately attach significance – is the classification constitutionally troublesome. 260 This
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Indeed, one might wonder whether framing the problem of genetics
exceptionalism as an exceptional problem raises its own set of problems.
257

In the face of public fears or concerns about a particular issue, legislators often
enact legislation that is over- and under-inclusive with respect to the fundamental concerns. For
example, as AIDS became a public issue, many legislators responded to public concerns by
enacting legislation that dealt specifically with HIV infection. For criticisms of this approach see
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, New Challenge to Idea that ‘AIDS is Special,’ N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1997,
at A1 (questioning “AIDS exceptionalism”).
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Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination,
125 U. PENN. L. REV. 540, 556 (1977) (“Incidental burdens have been thought the fair price
everyone . . . must pay, at some time or other for the societal advantages of law. After all,
virtually every piece of legislation is burdensome to somebody.”).
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Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 216 (1978).
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Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1068-69 (1979); Perry, supra note 258, at 557 (“[A]s long as a law does not
rest on an invidious classification and has a rational basis, the consequent disadvantage is
ethically inoffensive.”).
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lenient standard of review reflects “sympathy for difficulties of the legislative process” 261 and a
tolerance for the inevitable over- and under-inclusiveness of legislation.
But of course some legislative classifications are, if not constitutionally infirm, at least
constitutionally suspect. When a legislative classification burdens a fundamental right 262 or
targets a suspect class, 263 courts subject the statute to the virtually fatal heightened scrutiny
standard of review, which requires that the legislation fit very important goals more closely than
any alternative classification would. 264 In effect, equal protection law reflects a compromise
between ideals and reality. It expresses the ideal of treating similarly situated individuals
similarly, but it is also sympathetic to the challenges in achieving that ideal. This compromise
means that the law often tolerates legislative imperfections, unless certain important interests or
values are infringed.
Although this article does not suggest that courts would find that genetics legislation
violates the Equal Protection Clause, it argues that legislators should be guided by equal
protection values and under-enforced constitutional norms. More specifically, policy makers
should not tolerate the under-inclusiveness and resulting inequities of genetics legislation. As
legislators reexamine their genetics legislation in light of the new HIPAA privacy rules, this is an
ideal time for them to consider the ways in which the flaws of genetics legislation challenge
important constitutional values. Equal protection theory offers a valuable legal, moral, and
policy framework for analyzing which inequities are particularly troubling. Analysis of several
strands of equal protection theory suggests that, even if courts would not hold genetics
legislation unconstitutional, it results in inequities that legislators should find morally disturbing
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LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 995 (1st ed. 1978). Not
only do legislatures face difficulties in deciding the optimal classification, but they must also
consider the social, political, economic costs of more precise legislation, and the competing
interests be at stake.
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See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
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See, e.g, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 146 (1980).
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and which violate the spirit of the Constitution. Given the responsibility of legislators to respect
constitutional values that courts may not always enforce, legislators should be troubled by these
inequities even if judicial deference to their judgment would let these statutes stand. Although
public health rationales for genetics legislation provide a justification for genetics legislation, the
uncertainty as to whether genetics legislation would exacerbate the problem and whether the
problem is especially great in the genetics context weakens this justification. Part III therefore
concludes with final thoughts as to approaches legislators might take to eliminate the underinclusiveness of genetics legislation, using some federal approaches as guidelines.
A.

Equal Protection – The Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism
Although this Section explores equal protection theory to evaluate the under-

inclusiveness of genetics legislation, I must emphasize that my arguments are largely moral and
policy arguments, based on the spirit of the constitution, rather than arguments based on
technical constitutional infirmities. In other words, I am not claiming that genetics legislation
would fail under an equal protection attack. Genetics legislation does not directly target any
constitutionally recognized suspect classes. Moreover, the statutes do not implicate any of the
fundamental interests – such as voting, the right to travel, or access to the criminal process – to
which the Court has accorded special protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Genetics
legislation would therefore surely be subject to the rational-basis test, which it would likely
survive. The various rationales for genetics legislation discussed in Part II.A.1 as well as the
incrementalism would more than suffice. Indeed, a frequent defense to assertions of underinclusiveness is that “piecemeal legislation is a pragmatic means of effecting needed reforms,
where a demand for completeness may lead to total paralysis.” 265
That the courts would uphold genetics legislation on equal protection grounds is not in
and of itself reason to celebrate, or indeed support, the under-inclusiveness of the legislation. In
fact, to say that legislation would survive judicial review is not necessarily to say that the
legislation is constitutional. Courts may sometimes uphold statutes for institutional reasons,
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TRIBE, supra note 261, at 997. The potential success of that strategy need not be
established as long as the statute is subjected to a rational basis test.
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even when legislation is constitutionally problematic. For example, concerns about federalism,
judicial competence, or judicial restraint may motivate under-enforcement of constitutional
norms. 266 Therefore, it may sometimes be “incongruous to treat the products of such restraint as
authoritative determinations of constitutional substance.” 267 The fact that courts sometimes show
restraint and deference toward legislative classifications or that courts don’t implement certain
constitutional values means that legislators have an added responsibility to ensure that their
legislation is consistent with constitutional norms. In other words, legislators must take
responsibility for “fashion[ ing] their own conceptions of these norms and to measure their
conduct by reference to these conceptions.” 268 Therefore they should be concerned not only with
genetic legislation’s ability to survive judicial review, but also with its under-enforced
constitutional and normative value. 269
Even if genetics legislation would survive equal protection challenges in court, it may
nevertheless be inconsistent with the goals of equal protection, namely to ensure that the state
treats people equally, unless it is fair not to. 270 Equal protection theory offers a moral, legal, and
policy framework for establishing when it is “unfair” to treat similarly situated people
differently. 271 To demonstrate that the inequities of genetics legislation are unfair and bad
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Sager, supra note 259, at 1218, 1224.

267

Id. at 1226.
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Id. at 1227.
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My analysis relies on the “social good” model of legislation, which suggests that
legislation is a means of “achieving what a majority of the legislature has identified as desirable
‘social objectives,’” as opposed to a “public choice” model, which views legislation as the result
of “bargains struck between those helped by legislation and those who are harmed.” Scott Bice,
Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1980).
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Sager, supra note 259, at 1215.
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See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 3
CAL. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949); Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of
American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 67 (1998) (discussing Tussman and
71

policy, I turn to three equal protection theories – process theory, disparate impact theory, and
fundamental rights theory. Although, I am skeptical that any of these theories alone makes
genetics legislation constitutionally suspect, in conjunction, they raise significant moral,
political, and legal concerns about the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation.
1.

Process Theory
I begin with process theory, the germ of which arose in Justice Stone’s famous footnote

in United States v. Carolene Products Co.272 In trying to clarify the role of judicial review
following the wild judicial activism of the Lochner era, 273 Justice Stone suggested that the
Court’s ordinary deference to legislators would be inappropriate with respect to statutes
involving “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” 274
Forty years later, John Hart Ely developed this embryonic idea into a more complex
theory in his seminal book, Democracy and Distrust.275 From the perspective of process theory,
equal protection “principally concerns judicial solicitude for groups unable to fend for
themselves in the political trenches because of disenfranchisement, blatant prejudice, negative
stereotyping, or some combination thereof.” 276 In other words, process theory aims to protect
groups “in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in
attending,” 277 groups “who can’t protect themselves politically.”278 Although a group’s lack of
tenBroek’s article).
272

304 U.S. 144 (1938).

273

Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 213, 221-225 (1991).
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304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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ELY, supra note 264.
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Klarman, supra note 273, at 310.
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ELY, supra note 264, at 151.
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vote may raise particular process concerns, the inability to participate fully in the “pluralist’s
bazaar,” may be impeded by prejudice or legislative indifference to the interests of excluded
groups because the typical American legislature does not reflect the group’s demography. 279
Ely relied on this theory to explain why race, poverty, alienage, and homosexuality
should be treated as suspect classes. 280 Minority race is a suspect class in his view, not only
because race-based classifications stigmatize, but also because prejudice causes the popular
majorities to overlook or ignore the interests of minorities. 281 Though minorities have a vote and
political access – indeed blacks are majorities in many cities – political access alone cannot
ensure a meaningful voice in the political process. 282 Aliens are subject, at best, to similar
neglect, and, at worst, to hostility because legislatures are entirely made up of citizens. 283 Ely

278

Id. at 152.

279

Id. at 159. “Political access is surely important, but (so long as it falls short of
majority control) it cannot alone protect a group against . . . prejudice . . . [and] out and out
hostility.” Id. at 161.
280

The Supreme Court defines suspect classes more narrowly than Ely. It has not
treated homosexuality or poverty as a suspect class. See infra notes 284 and 285.
281

The Supreme Court, however, treats race per se, not just minority race, as a
suspect class. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (treating race as a
suspect class, but upholding a military order excluding Americans of Japanese origin from
designated West Coast areas following Pearl Harbor on the theory that the government interest
was compelling); Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a city plan to
increase the number of minority owned businesses who were awarded city construction
contracts).
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ELY, supra note 264, at 150-53. “If voices and votes are all we’re talking about,
prejudices can easily survive (and on occasion be exacerbated): other groups may just continue
to refuse to deal, and the minority in question may just continue to be outvoted.” Id. at 161.
Racial prejudice, Ely points out, may keep blacks on “the wrong end of the legislature’s
classifications.” Id. at 152.
283

Id. at 161-62. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (invalidating
a statute that conditioned welfare benefits upon either the possession of United States citizenship
or minimum residence in the United States); Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
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applies similar analysis to the poor, who although they can vote, are not well represented within
legislatures. 284 Finally, he argues homosexuality is a suspect class because prejudice and
stereotyping can result in hostile or neglectful legislation and because the cost of revealing one’s
sexuality in the face of such hostility makes it difficult to advocate for one’s interest. 285 Thus,
according to process theory, laws based on such classifications should receive strict scrutiny. 286
Process theory, therefore, is concerned about the very people who are disadvantaged by
genetics legislation, the poor and ethnic or racial minorities. 287 Ely’s process theory, however,
focuses on legislative classifications per se as opposed to the impact that such legislation may
have on suspect classes. He argues that, even if a statute’s impact is greater on one group than
another, the statute is not unconstitutional, unless the benefit concerns one to which we have
substantive constitutional entitlements. 288 Instead he focuses on suspicious classifications to
“‘flush[] out’ unconstitutional motivations.” 289 Although many laws may disproportionately

(invalidating a state court requirement of citizenship for admission to the bar); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (invalidating a statute requiring citizenship for any position in the
state civil service system).
284

ELY, supra note 264, at 162. The Supreme Court has not treated the poor as a
suspect class. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a statute whose
formula for aid to families with dependent children resulted in denial of benefits to children born
to families over a certain size); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973) (upholding a property tax system for financing primary and secondary education that
resulted in disparities in the amount of money spent on the education of individual children).
285

ELY, supra note 264, at 162-63. The court did not reach the question of whether
homosexuality is a suspect class in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995).
286

ELY, supra note 264, at 162.
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See supra TAN 222-231.
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Id. at 143, 145.
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Id. at 146. See also, Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44-53 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, not disparate impact,
is the touchstone of the Equal Protection clause).
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impact the poor, legislative classifications based on wealth are extremely rare. 290 As a result,
although Ely’s process theory of suspect classification would include the group that genetics
legislation disadvantages, it cannot alone explain why this legislation is problematic since the
legislation does not use race or wealth-based classifications.
2.

Disparate Impact Theory
If we are truly concerned about protecting groups “who can’t protect themselves

politically,” or who are “perennial losers in the political struggle,” 291 it is insufficient to focus
only on legislative classifications. Although legislation founded on illicit motivation with
respect to suspect classes is especially troubling, legislation that is selectively indifferent to those
classes is also problematic. Indeed concerns about a law’s disproportionate impact on suspect
classes is consistent with process theory. 292 For a period, the Warren Court seemed motivated by
precisely those concerns, suggesting that legislation could be invalidated solely for its
discriminatory effects, even without any evidence of overt discriminatory intent. 293 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis,294 however, ultimately rejected this non-motivational
theory of equal protection, holding that there could be no unconstitutional discrimination without
“discriminatory purpose” or illicit motivation. 295
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“A theory of suspicious classification will thus be of only occasional assistance
to the poor, since their problems are not often problems of classification to begin with,” but
problems of general societal disadvantages and governmental failures to alleviate poverty. ELY,
supra note 264, at 162.
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TRIBE, supra note 261, at 1002.
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Though the Court drew a sharp demarcation between bad purpose and bad effect, it need
not have. A “plausible alternative approach would treat legislatures’ selective indifference to a
protected group’s interests as sufficient grounds for condemning legislative decision making.” 296
And, in fact, some scholars have developed such an approach in their equal protection analysis.
For instance, some have argued that disparate impact theory is justified when the disadvantage
faced by the group is not only the consequence of the law, but “also and more fundamentally as a
consequence of prior governmental action that was constitutionally (and ethically) offensive.” 297
Because, for example, laws that disproportionately disadvantage blacks may reinforce racial
isolation and governmental wrongs of the past, they are potentially problematic. 298 Disparate
impact theory rests on the idea that the government has an affirmative obligation not to
“exacerbate the effects of prior discrimination.” 299 This affirmative obligation “serves
principally as a brake on the lamentable tendency of the majority race wilfully to oppress or
exploit racial minorities.”

300

The concern that selective indifference may “thoughtlessly and needlessly
[infringe] on the interests of racial minorities” 301 ties in well with process theory. Part of what
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Perry argues that laws that disproportionately disadvantage a racial minority
should be subjected to more rigorous review than the rational relationship test but less rigorous
than the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 559.
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Id. at 561. Perry is careful to distinguish disparate impact theory from affirmative
action. The former is “premised on the notion that government should not exacerbate the effects
of prior discrimination any more than is reasonably necessary to achieve the governmental
objective,” whereas “affirmative action theory calls for government to undo the effects of prior
discrimination.” Id.
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Id. at 556.
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Id. at 587 (“Legislatures and other government agencies are not as sensitive to the
interests of racial minorities as to majoritarian interests. Occasionally, a legislature will overlook
less intrusive ways of advancing its objectives and, instead, will infringe thoughtlessly and
76

makes the poor and minorities suspect classes under political process theory is the fact that they
are limited in their ability not only to counter illicitly motivated legislation, but also to persuade
the legislature to overcome its indifference to their concerns. If legislative indifference leaves
the politically disempowered at a disadvantage, even if only through disparate impact, political
processes are unlikely to overcome this problem.
These are precisely the problems that exist with genetics legislation. Genetics legislation
excludes protections with respect to the non-genetic risks that disproportionately affect the
politically disempowered, i.e., the poor and minorities. Such legislation is not the result of
hostility, but of insensitivity. State legislators tend to be middle or upper class individuals.
Genetic testing and therefore genetic discrimination are very much on their minds. For them the
threat of discrimination based on genetic risks looms larger than the threat of discrimination
based on non-genetic risks. Not surprisingly, therefore, they are eager to enact genetics
legislation. But because non-genetic risks do not occupy their concerns, legislators are
inattentive or selectively indifferent to the equally serious threats of discrimination based on nongenetic risks. 302 Given the powerful and institutionalized focus on genetic discrimination, 303 the
widespread failure to see how those concerns extend beyond genetics, and the lack of power
among the groups most disadvantaged by this legislation, it would seem that disparate impact
and process theory give legislators reason to be troubled by genetics-specific legislation.
3.

Fundamental Rights Theory
Although process and disparate impact theory bring us a long way toward explaining

some of the perils of genetics legislation, fundamental rights theory takes us a step further.
Because disproportionate impact theory imposes an affirmative obligation on states to avoid
unnecessary aggravation of the disadvantaged position of suspect classes, the case will be
stronger the more important or fundamental the burdened interest. Thus, the evaluation of
genetics legislation should consider not only the fact that a suspect class is disproportionately
needlessly on the interests of racial minorities.”).
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See supra TAN 230-231.
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See supra Part I.
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disadvantaged, but also that it is disadvantaged with respect to a serious interest. 304 In other
words, the inquiry brings together all three strands of equal protection theory.
The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes that disadvantage indigents with respect to
the criminal process, 305 family law matters, 306 voting rights, 307 and the ability to engage in
interstate travel. 308 Those decisions reflect the concerns described above and indeed could be
explained in light of the three equal protection theories. 309 First, even though the Court has not
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Once a disparate impact is shown, “factors other than disproportionate impact
become crucial, principally the private interest, in relation to which there is a disproportionate
impact, and the public interest, the pursuit of which by means of the challenged law or practice
has a disproportionate impact.” Perry, supra note 258, at 563. “The public fisc is not
exhaustible,” he notes, thus one needs to consider the importance of the private interest when
balancing them against the public interests. When they are deemed “indispensable to the
preservation of fundamental values,” we can justify dipping into the public fisc. Id. at 564.
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Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring the state to provide indigent
criminal appellants with a free transcript of the trial when necessary for full appellate review);
Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353 (1963) (requiring the state to provide indigent appellants
with counsel for their first appeal of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(requiring indigent criminal defendants accused of a felony to have court appointed counsel);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (requiring appointed counsel for all prosecutions that
result in imprisonment).
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Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating a statute requiring
payment of court costs when filing for a divorce); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(striking a law that restricted the ability of economically poor persons to marry).
307

Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (finding
unconstitutional Virginia’s poll tax for state elections).
308

Shapiro v. Thompson, 393 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating statutes that denied
welfare benefits to people who had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least one year);
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring a
minimum residency in order to receive non-emergency medical care at public expense); Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a statute requiring a minimal residency requirement to
become entitled to receive welfare benefits).
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In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court invalidated a state poll
tax on equal protection grounds, noting that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane
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treated the poor as a suspect class, these cases reflect concern for the special needs of the poor. 310
Second, the invalidated statutes were not based on wealth classifications, but instead had a
disparate impact on the poor by requiring, for example, criminal defendants to pay for transcripts
required for appeal, 311 the payment of court costs in order to seek a divorce, 312 the submission of
proof of compliance with child support obligations in order to marry, 313 the payment of a poll tax
to vote, 314 or a minimum duration of residency to obtain welfare benefits or medical care. 315 But
most important, the Court was motivated by the principle that certain interests – access to the
criminal process, voting, marriage, and the right to travel – are so constitutionally significant as
to invalidate statutes that impose disparate impacts based on wealth.
Although for institutional reasons the Supreme Court has not carried forward with full
force the promise of these decisions, 316 their normative content still has weight and is highly
applicable to genetics legislation. If wealth inequities with respect to voting rights and access to
the criminal process raise red flags, then so should inequities with respect to even more

to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.” 383 U.S at 668.
310

See Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term – Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1960) (developing
a Rawlsian “justice as fairness” theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, which imposes on the
government an affirmative duty of minimal protection to fulfill “just wants.”)
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See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 273, at 285-91 (explaining the Burger Court’s
retrenchment of the fundamental rights strand of equal protection largely because of institutional
concerns such as wealth distribution).
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compelling and basic needs such as food, health care, and shelter. 317 Indeed, the Court’s
decision to invalidate a statute requiring at least a year of residency to receive publicly funded
non-emergency health care was influenced by the necessity of health care. 318 Genetics
legislation concerns interests, which even if not yet fundamental under the Constitution in the
Court’s view, would be deeply important, even fundamental, to many. One’s interest in
preventing health insurance discrimination is of course tied to one’s interest in health care. For
many, the function of health insurance is to ensure access to the social good of health care. 319
Indeed, many have argued that health care is a fundamental moral right. 320 Similarly, protections
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Shapiro, 394 US at 618, emphasized that a statute that denied welfare assistance
to those who had been residents for less than a year resulted in the new residents’ being “denied
welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of families to obtain the very means to subsist –
food, shelter, and other necessities of life.” The concern that this group was disadvantaged with
respect to the “necessities of life” merely on the basis of length of residence in the state,
subjected the statute to strict scrutiny.
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“[D]iseases if untreated for a year, may become all but irreversible paths to pain,
disability, and even loss of life.” Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 261.
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See Daniels, supra note 54, at 119; Hall & Rich, supra note 230, at 250-51. The
Michigan Commissioner of Insurance, for example, decided that certain types of insurance are
essential and then created a guaranteed right to essential insurance. Gaulding, supra note 55, at
1690; Jacobi, supra note 41, at 372-73. Norman Daniels argues that health care is necessary for
equal opportunity and the ability to achieve normal species functioning. Daniels, supra, at 118.
Since health care is important to restore or maintain normal species functioning, which is a
crucial determinant of the opportunities available to us, Daniels concludes that justice requires
access to health care. Since actuarial rating in health insurance makes access to health care
benefits depend on the ability to pay and on individual risk, it does not protect equal opportunity.
Id. Some are skeptical, however, about whether American society really treats much beyond
education as a social good. Marmor, supra note 233, at 97.
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See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 39-48 (1985) (arguing that
society has a moral to insure the provision of health care services based on a Rawlsian theory of
justice); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTING L.J. 1, 4 (1987); Wendy Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection
of the Law: The Need for a New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 345, 371-77 (1986)
(arguing that health care deserves special protection under the Constitution); Russell Korobkin,
Determining Health Care Rights From Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 801
(1998) (suggesting that under the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, people would choose a society that
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against employment discrimination address the importance of employment to one’s wellbeing. 321 Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional “interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.” 322 As one of my colleagues notes, “[p]rivacy protects us from
being misdefined and judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a world in which
information can easily be confused with knowledge.” 323 It is, in short, a serious and deep,
fundamental interest.

guarantees some positive rights to health care); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a
Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659. But see, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, M ORTAL
PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997); Robert Bork, The Impossibility of
Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695. For critical and
thoughtful discussions of these issues see Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82
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Justifications, 3 STAN. L. & POL' Y REV. 90 (1991). Much of the criticism of our approach to
health care in this country has been premised on the notion that health care is a fundamental or
important moral right. Justice Ginsburg has described our Constitution as “very skimpy”
because, unlike many other constitutions in the world, it does not guarantee such fundamental
rights as health care. See W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg’s Charge That the
Constitution is “Skimpy” in Comparison to Our International Neighbors, 39 S. TEX. L. REV.
951, 952 (1998).
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Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). The Court noted that this was one
of two privacy interests, the other being the “interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.” Id. The under-inclusiveness of genetics privacy legislation does not
implicate the privacy interests in avoiding governmental interference that are the basis for the
constitutional right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Rather the underinclusiveness of genetics legislation is more analogous to the problematic, selective funding for
abortions. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding that states have no obligation to fund
nontherapeutic abortions as a condition for receiving funding in a joint federal-state medical
assistance program); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that Connecticut’s refusal to
pay for nontherapeutic abortions does not violate the equal protection clause); Poelker v. Doe,
432 U.S. 519 (1977) (finding constitutional the decision of municipal hospitals to finance
childbirth services while failing to pay for nontherapeutic abortion services).
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Analyzing genetics legislation under the three lenses of process, disparate impact, and
fundamental rights theories, suggests that the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation may not
promote the social goods that underlie these theories, even if it would survive judicial scrutiny.
Indeed, it conflicts with the spirit of the Constitution and may even violate under-enforced
constitutional norms. Moreover, it challenges important moral and policy concerns. Legislators
should therefore be wary of legislation that disproportionately impacts a vulnerable class with
respect to very important interests and which exacerbates disadvantages among groups who have
limited political influence to overcome these disadvantages.
B.

The Public Health Defense – Responding to Public Fears
Although the normative concerns about the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation are

problematic, the evaluation of the legislation is incomplete without some consideration of
competing public interests. As noted earlier, equal protection strikes a compromise between
ideals and political realities. It recognizes that legislators often balance a number of different
objectives. Attending to inequities, even serious ones, may sometimes create more severe
problems in other areas. Thus, to evaluate fully the consequence of the disparate impact of
genetics, this section turns to the competing public interests. Because the inequities raise serious
concerns, only strong public interests should suffice to overcome these concerns. 324
We considered the incrementalism argument earlier, which might justify genetics
legislation under a rational basis test. 325 But it is insufficient to overcome the serious inequities
described above. Moreover, precisely because of the nature of the interests of the political
majority and the strongly entrenched genetics exceptionalism perspective, one should be gravely
skeptical about the success of such a strategy, which relies on genetics exceptionalism
arguments. A more persuasive governmental interest is necessary to justify exacerbating the
disadvantages of vulnerable groups.
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Perry suggests a balancing of private and public interests that approaches an
intermediate standard or review. See Perry, supra note 258, at 559-60; see also TRIBE, supra
note 261, at 1089.
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See supra Part II.C.
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The strongest justification for creating special protections for genetic information has to
do with public perceptions, in particular the perception that genetics discrimination is a
problem. 326 While it is difficult to establish whether that perception is well founded, the
perception itself may be real. Increasingly, commentators and legislators worry that public fears
may prevent society from reaping the full benefits of genetics. One worry is that the fear will
dissuade people from obtaining genetic testing that might be beneficial to their health or from
participating in genetics research. 327 The National Human Genome Research Institute has taken
these concerns to heart and fought aggressively to promote genetics legislation on these
grounds. 328
To many, this justification for genetics legislation carries special force because it appears
to be the only one that seems truly unique to genetic information. Indeed this has been the
primary justification for genetics-specific legislation. 329 Although a great deal of attention has
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See supra note 164. "In genetic testing studies at the National Institutes of
Health, thirty-two percent of eligible people who were offered a test for breast cancer risk
declined to take it, citing concerns about loss of privacy and the potential for discrimination in
health insurance." Sen. Leahy's comments for March 10, 1999 Introduction of the Medical
Information Privacy and Security Act (quoted in Standards for Privacy for Individually
Identifiable Health Information, Regulation Preamble, 45 C.F.R. § 160.101 (2001)).
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See Prepared Statement of Francis Collins, M.D., Ph.D., Director, National
Human Genome Research Institute, House Science Committee Technology Subcommittee,
Subject – Genetic Testing in the New Millennium: Advances, Standards, Implications, April 21,
1999 (suggesting these fears of discrimination require federal “genetic discrimination”
legislation); Prepared Statement of Francis Collins, M.D., Ph.D., Director, National Human
Genome Research Institute, National Institutes of Health Before the House Science Committee
Subcommittee on Technology on Technological Advances in Genetics Testing: Implications for
the Future, Sept. 17, 1996 (“In order to assure that the Nation benefits from the fruits of genetic
research, safeguards must be in place to protect individual privacy and prevent insurance and
employment discrimination.”).
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See floor statements for S. 318, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); H.R. 602, 107th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2001); and S. 382, 107th Cong., 1 st Sess. (2001) (all arguing that to reap the
benefits of the human genome project and encourage beneficial genetic testings, genetics
legislation is necessary).
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been directed to this issue recently, the concern is not actually unique to genetics. Indeed, one of
the arguments in favor of federal privacy protections was that some people avoid medical care
because of fears of discrimination. 330 Similar concerns that worries about discrimination based
on sensitive medical information might prevent people from participating in sensitive clinical
research inspired Congress to enact legislation to protect the privacy of medical research.
Specifically, the statute allows the Department of Health and Human Services, through the
issuance of certificates of confidentiality, to “authorize persons engaged in biomedical,
behavioral, clinical, or other research . . . to protect the privacy of individuals who are the subject
of such research by withholding from all persons not connected with the conduct of such
research the names or other identifying characteristics of such individuals.” 331
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The preamble of the final HIPAA privacy rules notes the importance of privacy
protections so that patients will openly discuss their concerns and medical conditions with their
physicians. Some evidence suggests that to “protect their privacy and avoid embarrassment,
stigma, and discrimination, some people withhold information from their health care providers,
provide inaccurate information, doctor-hop to avoid a consolidated medical record, pay out-ofpocket for care that is covered by insurance, and - in some cases - avoid care altogether,” thereby
hindering optimal medical care. Standards for Privacy for Individually Identifiable Health
Information, Regulation Preamble, 45 C.F.R. § 160.101 (2001). “Recent studies show that a
person who does not believe his privacy will be protected is much less likely to participate fully
in the diagnosis and treatment of his medical condition. . . . [and that] one in six Americans
reported that they have taken some sort of evasive action to avoid the inappropriate use of their
information by providing inaccurate information to a health care provider, changing physicians,
or avoiding care altogether.” Similarly, nearly half of Americans with mental disorders never
seek treatment because, among other things, they fear discrimination and stigmatization. Robert
Pear, Mental Disorders Common, U.S. Says: Many Not Treated, N.Y. TIMES , Dec. 13, 1999, at
A1.
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42 U.S.C.A § 241(d). Researchers who receive the certificate of confidentiality
“may not be compelled in any Federal, State, or local, civil, criminal, administrative, legislative,
or other proceedings to identify” their research subjects. 42 U.S.C.A § 241(d). The original
version of the statute applied only to alcohol- and drug-abuse research. Charles L. Earley &
Louise C. Strong, Certificates of Confidentiality: A Valuable Tool for Protecting Genetic Data,
57 AM. J. HUM . GENETICS 727, 727 (1995). The initial concern was that it was difficult to find
research subjects willing to admit they had engaged in illegal conduct. Mark Rothstein,
Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages
in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 905 n.200 (1996). A 1988 amendment expanded
the scope of protected research to include “biomedical, behavioral clinical, or other research,” 42
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Although these concerns transcend the genetics context, some might argue that the risks
are greater in the genetics context, simply because so much has been made of the threat of
genetic discrimination in the popular culture and media. And indeed, recently, much more seems
to be written about public health threats in this area than other areas. 332 However, just as it is
unclear how serious genetics discrimination currently is or will be, so too is it unclear how much
fears of genetics discrimination actually inhibit the public from participating in genetic testing or
research. Even fewer studies have examined the effects of public fears than have studied
genetics discrimination. 333 One might therefore argue that these concerns are far too speculative
to justify the costs of genetics legislation’s under-inclusiveness. But that response is too glib.
Given the strong intensity of public fears of genetics, it stands to reason that this might well
affect public receptiveness to genetic testing and research, now or in the future. Clearly we need
better data. At this point, we have too little to dismiss it as a non-problem.
Presuming for the moment that this is a significant public health concern and that it is a
greater problem than the public health risk in other areas (a debatable point indeed), one might
nevertheless worry that the remedy would exacerbate the very harm it intends to cure. By
responding to public’s fears with special protections for genetic information, genetics legislation
may validate and fuel the flames of these fears as well as the underlying perspective which
generates those fears. 334 Moreover, it tends to stigmatize genetic information by suggesting that
U.S.C.A § 241(d), “thereby recognizing that negative consequences could attach to research
subjects' lawful activities as well,” Rothstein, supra, at 905 n.200.
332

In searching for documentation of concerns that fears of discrimination with
respect to other medical information prevent people from participating in health care or
biomedical research, my research assistant came across articles that almost exclusively focused
on this issue in the genetics context.
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One recent study found that only thirty-eight percent (8 out of 21) of genetic
counselors thought that such concerns were a “major barrier” to adult patients. Hall & Rich,
supra note 230, at 249. Only two counselors suggested as many as 80-90% of adult patients
refuse genetic testing based on those fears. Two counselors estimated that two more that 50% of
adult patients refuse on those grounds. Virtually all counselors indicated that pediatric or
prenatal patients were not deterred by concerns of discrimination. Id.
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Hall, supra note 165, at F7; Reilly, supra note 8, at 126-27.
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it warrants special protections. The mere presence of such legislation can perpetuate the view
that genetics discrimination is a serious problem requiring the law’s intervention and that genetic
information is uniquely susceptible to abuse. Indeed, as the media draw attention to this
legislation, the public reads more about genetics discrimination, and legislators enact more laws,
the spiral of fear and genetics exceptionalism is intensified. 335
How much genetics legislation will remedy or exacerbate public fears and whether this is
a greater concern with respect to genetic or other medical information are empirical questions.
Some might find these laws reassuring even if they intensify concerns about genetics
discrimination. Others may be unpersuaded that the protections are sufficient. It is difficult to
determine whether the benefit of encouraging some people to engage in genetic testing and
research outweighs the harms of intensifying public fears and reinforcing genetics
exceptionalism in others. The uncertainty as to whether genetics-specific legislation will remedy
or exacerbate the public health concerns and whether this is a more significant issue in the
genetics context than other medical areas places legislators in a quandary in light of the
inequities raised by genetics legislation. They have a legitimate interest in promoting both
public health and equality. Is there a solution that allows legislators to have it both ways?
C.

Moving Away From Genetics Exceptionalism
A clear – though perhaps politically challenging – solution to the quandary facing

legislators does exist. Legislative protections should focus on the broader issues of
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Similar objections have been raised against affirmative action, i.e., that the
remedy exacerbates the discrimination it tries to eliminate. One fear is that it reinforces negative
perceptions by stigmatizing minorities, perpetuating a dependency stereotype, Croson, 488 U.S.
at 493-494; Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (Powell, J.); United Jewish Organization v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring), and creating the misperception that
minorities require special assistance because they are inferior. Brest, supra note 289, at 18.
Some worry that because it disadvantages whites, affirmative action will create new levels of
animus against minorities and enhance racial divisiveness. Randall Kennedy, Commentary:
Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327,
1330 (1986). Finally, some fear affirmative action may affect the morale and self-image of
minorities. Will they worry, for example, that their admission to college or new employment
was the result of preferential treatment as opposed to “truly earned?” Kennedy, supra, at 133132.
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discrimination and privacy rather than whether information is genetic or not. If legislators
extended the protections of genetics information to other medical information – i.e., if they
eliminated the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation – then they could have their cake and
eat it. Protections would be in place to protect the public against discrimination not only with
respect to genetic information, but also with respect to other medical information. Informing the
public of these protections would reduce public fears about genetics discrimination. But by
avoiding genetics-specific protections, it would be less likely to exacerbate fears of genetics
discrimination. Indeed, the broader scope of protection might go a long way toward eliminating
genetics exceptionalism. Moreover, these broader protections would dissolve the equal
protection concerns raised by genetics legislation.
Whether legislators will take that course depends on numerous factors. As noted in Part
I, several institutional forces contribute to the widespread support for genetics-legislation. As
long as genetics exceptionalism is the prevailing viewpoint among the public, media, scientists,
and legislators, comprehensive protections of medical information will receive less support. 336
The goal then must be to move the debate away from genetics exceptionalism and to demystify
genetics. The media must become attentive to the problem of genetics exceptionalism, 337 which
will reshape public attitudes. And they should take care to emphasize the more nuanced
messages that some scientists present about the complex role of genes and environment. 338 Most
important, legislators must understand that genetic information is merely one point along the
spectrum of important medical information. Their motivations to prevent discrimination and
privacy invasions are commendable but too limited and inequitable as long as they focus on
genetics alone. The more legislators understand that the same concerns exist with respect to a
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One might think that the same arguments could be made for incrementalism. But,
because the strategy of incrementalism requires masking the ultimate goal, it initially depends on
claims of principled distinctions between genetic and non-genetic information that do not exist.
See supra note 241.
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Media attitudes can change, as they did with respect to “AIDS exceptionalism.”
See Stolberg, supra note 257, at A1 (questioning “AIDS exceptionalism”).
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See supra TAN 88-89.
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great deal of medical information, the greater the chances for expanding the protections of
genetics legislation to other areas. How the issues are framed shapes the institutional
perspectives and ultimately the policies legislators promote. 339
Rather than making the discussion genetics-centric, policy makers should focus on the
features of genetic information that inspire political and public support for genetic legislation,
and use those concerns to craft more far reaching legislation. In the privacy context, the HIPAA
privacy rules, which went into effect on April 14, 2001, offer an ideal policy approach that both
satisfies the public health concerns regarding the public’s fear of genetic discrimination and
avoids genetics exceptionalism. Responding to the fact that “many believe that individuals
should have some right to control personal and sensitive information about themselves [and that
among] different sorts of personal information, health information is among the most sensitive,”
the final rules protect health information generally. 340 Specifically, the rules protect all
individually identifiable health information in any form, electronic or non-electronic, that is held
or transmitted by a covered entity.” 341 “Individually identifiable health information” is defined
as:
information that is a subset of health information, including demographic information
collected from an individual, and: (1) Is created or received by a health care provider,
health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present,
or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health
care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health
care to an individual; and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which
there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the
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“The factual and emotional aspects of policy images are believed to be the keys to
attracting political attention, redefining issues, and mobilizing previously apathetic bystanders
into political participation.” True, supra note 242, at 8.
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Standards for Privacy for Individually Identifiable Health Information,
Regulation Preamble, 45 C.F.R. § 160.101 (2001).
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Id. at §164.500.
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individual. 342
Because the final rules are intended to preserve existing, strong state confidentiality laws,
the rules will provide a national “floor” of privacy protections for all Americans. 343 This
approach will require state legislatures to determine whether their privacy statutes are more
stringent than the federal rules. Reflecting on that question provides legislatures with an ideal
opportunity to reconsider their genetics exceptionalist approaches. To stay true to the spirit of
equal protection principles, and in light of the unintended inequities surrounding geneticsspecific legislation, they would do well to follow the federal lead in expanding the protections of
those statutes to include all medical information. Federal legislators who are considering
enacting genetics privacy statutes, even in light of the HIPAA privacy rules, would also be welladvised to broaden their approach to privacy concerns.
To the extent that state nondiscrimination genetics statutes are linked to genetic privacy
concerns, legislatures will also have to reexamine their approach to nondiscrimination in the
insurance and employment contexts. Again, they would be advised to focus on the features of
genetic information that inspire political and public support for genetic legislation and use those
concerns to craft more far reaching legislation. For example, if what troubles the public about
insurance underwriting based on genetic information is the fact that it involves risks outside our
control, policy makers should focus on “control,” not genetics. Many environmental and
sociological risks and pre-existing conditions include, to a large extent, elements outside of our
control. 344 If it is the predictive or hidden nature of the information that troubles the public,
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Specifically, a “standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted
under [the rules] that is contrary to a provision of State law preempts the provision of State law .
. . [unless] the provision of State law relates to the privacy of health information and is more
stringent than” the federal rules.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2001).
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See Theresa Williams, Note and Comment, “Going Bare”: Insurance and the
Pre-Existing Condition Problem, 15 J. L. & COM . 375, 380-82 (1995). Many of those conditions
will be the manifestation of genetic conditions or exposures to environmental risks. Shouldn’t
we be as troubled by the woman with the BRCA1 gene whose insurance coverage is denied or
compromised because she has actually developed breast cancer as the woman who is merely at
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policy makers should examine other predictive or hidden factors beyond genetics. By parsing
out the concerns in terms of features of genetic information that trouble the public, rather than
focusing on genetic information per se, the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation becomes
strikingly apparent and increases the chance policy makers might extend those protections more
broadly.
For example, the public is troubled by health insurers setting premiums on genetic
information because genetic information can be predictive and outside our control. But because
these features apply to other medical information, perhaps legislators should consider community
rating in health insurance generally. 345 Currently our system has a default rule that allows
insurers to access and use most medical information for underwriting purposes, with a few
exceptions for race, genetics, and in some instances gender. 346 If policy makers understand that
many risk factors are significantly outside of our control and predictive, the opposite default rule
might be more appropriate. In other words, perhaps insurers should not be able to obtain or use
most medical information for underwriting purposes, with some exceptions for certain kinds of
risky behavior, which seem more in our control and for which we might want to create
disincentives. 347 There have been some movements in that direction at both the state 348 and

an increased risk. For the woman with cancer, access to insurance becomes a matter of life and
death.
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See Jacobi, supra note 41, at 374-75, for arguments that various legislative
actions reflect an increased acceptance of community rating or social pooling. The libertarian
notion of distributive justice, however, would argue against such an approach. This view holds
that it is unjust to ask people who face lower risks to bear the burdens of other people’s higher
risks, as community rating would do, whether or not the higher risks are beyond one’s control.
In short, they would view it as an unconsented taking of property without consent. See Daniels,
supra note 118, at 112-15.
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Gaulding, supra note 55, at 1659-74.
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Of course, trying to carve out exceptions for either default rule is exceedingly
complicated and presents perennial line-drawing problems. Given the administrative costs and
complexity of analyzing and applying actuarial data, policy makers might instead employ other,
likely more effective disincentives, such as taxing risky behavior.
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federal level. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, for example,
eliminated the use of medical information (including genetic information) for the underwriting of
group insurance plans. 349 In addition, the interim final rules, allow group health plans to
“exclude coverage for injuries that do not result from a medical condition or domestic violence,
such as injuries, sustained in high-risk activities like bungee jumping.” 350 Group plans, however,
cannot exclude people from enrollment for coverage or charge higher premiums based on risky
behavior. 351
Similar policy alternatives exist with respect to genetic discrimination in employment and
genetic privacy. Here again, we have a federal model. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) protects against employment and other forms of discrimination against the disabled.
The protected class is defined broadly, not just with respect to certain classes of disability or
perceived disability. 352 Such an approach is more coherent and equitable than a disease-specific
approach. Ideally genetic information and other predictive information are protected by the
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See Jacobi, supra note 41, at 373-78, 383-84 (noting that most states adopt some
form of restriction on the setting of premium rates, though only a few are scheduled to
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349

The statute states that neither a group health plan or health carrier insuring the
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ADA, although it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would read the ADA so expansively. 353
Nevertheless, the ADA offers one model for addressing the concerns underlying genetic
discrimination in employment. 354 It is far preferable to treat genetic discrimination as part of a
larger category of information vulnerable to employment discrimination than as a category unto
itself.
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In 1995, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interpreted the
ADA as prohibiting employment discrimination based on genetic makeup. 2 U.S. EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Order 915.002, at 902-45 (1995). Though this interpretation is not
binding on courts, it offers some persuasive authority. Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624, 661
(1998), which recognized asymptomatic HIV as a disability that substantially limited a major life
activity, has been read by some to suggest that a genetic predisposition might similarly be
viewed as a disability. See Miller, supra note 55, at 242-45. But Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
dissent in Bragdon expresses concern that the majority’s approach, “taken to its logical extreme,
would render every individual with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease ‘disabled’ here
and now because of some future effects.” 524 U.S. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Some
argue that Bragdon and more recent Supreme Court cases, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119
S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999), raise serious doubts as to whether the Court would
include presymptomatic or asymptomatic genetic information under the ADA. See Laura E.
Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination: Why Bragdon Does Not Ensure Protection, 3 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’ Y 330, 347-50 (2000).
Recently, the EEOC settled the first challenge brought under the ADA regarding genetic
testing in the workplace. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendant, Burlington Northern
was prohibitied from requiring employees to submit to genetic tests, analyzing any blood or
genetic tests previously obtained, or retaliating against any employees who refused genetic tests.
EEOC Settles ADA Suit Against BNSF for Genetic Bias, http:www.eeoc.gov/press/4-18-01.html
(visited 5/15/2001).
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Of course, there are tensions between broad nondiscrimination efforts and efforts
to make the workplace safe. Some have argued that there may be appropriate times to
discriminate in the workplace “to protect the safety of workers or the public” Yesley, supra note
136, at 663. On the other hand, one worries about reliance on genetic testing as the sole means
of making workplaces safer. In other words, employers should be making efforts to clean up the
workplace, whether or not susceptibility testing is available.
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The problem with using the ADA model in this way, however, is that it “labels”
genetic and other predictive information as a disability. But given that the ADA is concerned
with perceptions of as well as real disabilities, it does seem to fall within the purview of the
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In short, the new HIPAA rules provide not only an ideal model of a non-genetics
exceptionalist approach for state and federal legislators, but also an ideal opportunity for them to
reexamine the trend toward genetics exceptionalism with respect to insurance nondiscrimination,
employment nondiscrimination, and privacy protections. Legislators should be commended for
the good intentions that led to genetics-specific legislation; but after nearly a decade of
legislative experimentation, it is time for them to learn from the unintended negative effects of
their efforts. Specifically, they should be attentive to the serious inequities of genetics-specific
legislation and, in the spirit of the legal, moral and policy values surrounding the Equal
Protection Clause, should broaden the nondiscrimination and privacy protections to include all
medical information.
CONCLUSION
Although public support for genetics legislation makes it politically low-cost, such
legislation is seriously under-inclusive, resulting in troubling inequities. Genetics legislation –
through legislative oversight, rather than hostility – is selectively indifferent to the fact that poor
minorities face a disproportionate degree of non-genetic risks, which share many of the features
of genetic information. As a result, genetics legislation exacerbates class inequities in a group
that, under a process theory of equal protection, has the features of a suspect class. Because this
disproportionate impact concerns serious private interests related to access to health care,
employment, and privacy, the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation raises serious
normative and policy concerns and implicates under-enforced constitutional values.
Legislators have legitimate interests in allaying fears about genetics so that we can reap
its full benefits. Genetics legislation, however, provides a questionable remedy because it may
unintentionally exacerbate the very fears it tries to eliminate. Morever, it retains troubling
inequities. The better strategy is therefore to enact more comprehensive legislation, which
eliminates the under-inclusiveness of genetic legislation and avoids the spiral of genetics
exceptionalism.
I recognize that my mandate for legislators is challenging. And if given a choice between

ADA’s goals.
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genetics legislation or nothing, sadly and reluctantly, I would settle for the former, all the while
urging legislators to go further. But I believe that we can and should demand more from
legislators. The key to the success of my strategy is to reconceptualize the problems and to shift
the focus on genetics to a focus on the features of medical information that make it susceptible to
discrimination and invasions of privacy. Legislation based on those concerns will be more
equitable, coherent, and just.
The time is ripe for this new perspective and approach, especially in the wake of the new
HIPAA privacy regulations. Moreover, the recent discoveries from the final draft of the human
genome require us to reevaluate our relationship to genetics. The gene is important, but not all
important. Proteins and the environment will gain prominence in our understanding of disease
and behavior as we seek explanations for the diversity and complexity of humans, whose
genome is only twice as large as that of a roundworm. These new puzzles offer us the chance,
indeed compel us, to reframe our conception of the gene. As we enter the second phase of
genetics research with a fully sequenced human genome, let us take the surprising revelations
from the genome sequencing as an invitation to reject genetics exceptionalism.
But let us also take away from our experience with the legislative experimentation in
genetics the larger lesson of the problem of middle-class entitlements. This problem is not
unique or exceptional to genetics exceptionalism. The equal protection values described in this
article transcend the problems of discrimination and privacy. They raise deep concerns about
society’s obligation toward the disadvantaged, not only with respect to health care, but also with
respect to other deeply important interests fundamental to living a good life, such as education
and housing. This piece offers a starting point with respect to the narrower problem of
discrimination based on and privacy of medical information, but invites a broader application of
the methodology to other areas of serious inequity.
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